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The following essays in public choice are concerned with two main subjects: 
changes in public educational quality due to competition from surrounding private 
schools and the settings that foster increased interest group activity and what impact that 
activity has on the relative economic development of US states.  While these subjects 
may seem varied, they are both important in understanding differences in economic 
development.   
Education has long been associated with economic expansion, so it is important to 
understand the impacts that private markets for education have on its public provision.  In 
Chapter II, I look at whether there are competitive effects on public schools in California 
due to the existence of surrounding private schools, and if these effects induce public 
schools to provide a better education to students. If public institutions are prone to 
respond to competitive pressures, there is a timing issue that may prevent immediate 
improvements.  Since public schools are likely to take time to respond to competitive 
pressures, I use lagged private school enrollment as an explanatory variable for public 
school test scores. My results indicate that public schools do respond to higher degrees of 
competition from surrounding private schools, but that the effects are delayed.    
The latter two chapters discuss topics under the special interest group theory of 
government.  This theory holds that special interest groups dissipate real resources in the 
economy by paying for favorable legislation and transfers of wealth from the government 
through lobbying.  To demonstrate evidence for this theory, I first provide a study on the 
 iii 
settings that foster interest group accumulation across US states.  This study uses panel 
data for US states over the time period 1990-2005 to explain those factors that lead to the 
formation of interest groups.  
The number of trade associations is used to proxy the number of interest groups 
and my results show that population differences, socioeconomic development, 
differences in the structure of legislature, government and industry, and public spending 
are important factors in determining interest group formation.  Additional evidence is 
provided to measure the impact interest group activity has on economic development.  
Several measures of economic development are used including the number of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) per state.  I find that interest group activity through the 
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A wide array of research attempts to understand what makes some countries or 
regions more economically wealthy than others.  The following essays take a public 
choice approach to this question and explore additional aspects that either aid or hinder 
economic development.  The topics explored are education, which has long been shown 
to aid in the growth of economies, and interest groups, which are a more controversial 
topic when it comes to their impact on wealth and development.  Both topics also tie into 
the question of how private markets, such as privately provided education or privately 
funded interest groups, affect the ability of public institutions to function efficiently. 
For example, the Chapter II outlines the impact private markets for education 
have on the quality of publicly provided education.  Because public schools have 
differing incentives from that of their private counter parts, one might imagine that public 
schools would have little incentive to act competitively in the provision of education.  Of 
course both types of schools have in mind the goal of quality education for their students, 
but private schools also have in mind the goal of cost effectiveness.  Public schools on 
the other hand may be more interested in budget maximization.   
Schools that do not use the budget allotted to them typically lose some funding; 
therefore, it may be in a public school’s best interest to find something to spend their 
money on.  Rather than the efficient allocation of resources that takes place within private 
firms, it may choose to spend its budget on materials for those teachers who “lobby” the 
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most for additional funds allocation.  Or, it may choose to spend a technology ear-marked 
budget on new technology that provides little marginal benefit over the old technology. 
As an anecdotal example of this type of technology spending, each year during 
the 1990s my parents’ family-owned computer business would submit a bid to provide 
new computer technology to the local public schools.  Bids were cast by other local 
computer businesses, as well as national businesses, such as Dell Computers, Inc.  For 
many years my parents sold computers to the local public schools and were paid with 
budgetary funds ear marked for technology spending.  New computers were purchased 
every year that were only marginally better than the computers purchased the previous 
school year; however, if these funds were not spent they would not be re-allocated the 
next school year.   
Old computers were cycled down as protocol allowed to other government 
projects with smaller budgets such as after-school and in-school suspension programs; 
however, many times these year-old computers were hauled away to older, little-used 
government buildings and were sold as government surplus by the pallet for next to 
nothing.  Even though these year-old computers were equally as functional as the newly 
purchased computers for school labs, the budget was exhausted simply to retain the same 
or better budgetary allocations the next year.  Is it true that tax dollars spent in such a way 
really improve the quality of education received by public school students?   
A related question:  Does competition from surrounding private schools induce 
public schools to take actions to increase the quality of education provided and spend 
their budgets more efficiently?  It is the latter question that Chapter II attempts to address.  
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The current literature has not yet come to a definitive answer regarding this issue; 
however, no study to my knowledge has considered the possibility that public schools 
may take a significant amount of time to react to such competition by making quality 
increasing changes to public education.  Chapter II investigates the possibility of a lagged 
quality increase due to higher levels of competition from private schools.   
The following two chapters discuss the settings that foster interest group 
formation and what impact interest group activity has on economic development.  
Chapter III focuses on the differences in interest group formation across US states and 
what promotes these differences.  Our government is seemingly more representative of 
well-organized pressure groups rather than the general public.  While there are laws in 
place intended to prevent the “purchase” of legislation by any one citizen or group of 
citizens, donations of campaign funds and promises of votes from large and/or well-
funded groups heavily influence the decisions of elected representatives.   
This system of influence is merely a consequence of the benefit-maximizing 
coordination between groups who can easily organize and obtain government favor, and 
representatives who wish to obtain or keep their elected positions.  The problem lies in 
the negative impacts on those who remain less represented in the formulation of 
Congressional decisions.  Because a large portion of tax payers find it costly to organize 
and lobby, they must produce the tax revenue used to provide subsidies to these well-
organized groups.  They must also suffer any negative consequences of laws passed to 
favor these groups, such as decreased competition, distortions that create economic 
inefficiency and deadweight loss.   
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It should be duly noted that these groups are not to blame in any way for such 
gross inefficiency, nor are the politicians that help them succeed in obtaining government 
favor.  Again, they are all merely benefit maximizing actors responding to the political 
system they face.  It should also be noted that the response to this political system results 
in rent-seeking, or the use of productive resources as investments for procuring transfers 
of wealth.  Chapter IV is meant to illustrate how using productive resources to procure 
transfers rather than re-investing them in order to generate additional productive 
resources has a negative impact on economic development. 
In essence, interest groups use income generated through mutually beneficial 
exchange as a means of convincing politicians to allocate transfers of wealth in their 
direction.  If this type of resource allocation were not an option, then those productive 
resources would be invested back into the economy in the form of consumer spending, 
investment or time spent producing goods and services.  Instead, time and money are 
spent to acquire wealth from those who lack the organization or influence to prevent 
those transfers. 
Many economists view this as an unproductive use of productive resources.
1
  If 
this type of activity is truly unproductive and generates overall negative impacts on 
economic surplus, then we should see less economic development where there is more 
interest group activity.  Chapter IV tests this theory empirically using measures of interest 
group activity formulated in Chapter III.  Given the recent economic downturn, it is 
especially crucial to understand what fosters economic development and what hinders it.  
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Private schools offer a wider variety of instruction methods to choose from than 
the average public school.  If you prefer your child to be educated under a particular 
religious view or if you prefer him or her to learn military-like self discipline, private 
schools practically have it covered when it comes to the selection of educational products 
available.  This is good news for the parent willing to pay for these amenities, but do the 
competitive instincts felt by private schools actually aid in providing a better education 
for public school students?   
When measuring the quality of educational product offered by public schools, test 
scores remain the traditional method.  This chapter addresses the question of what, if any, 
effect a competitively behaving private school has on its public school neighbors.  Are 
low-income parents who would like to send their children to private schools, but cannot 
afford it, benefited, harmed or unaffected by the private market for education?  We know 
the consumers paying for private school are happy with the product they are purchasing 
as long as they continue to pay tuition.  But, are low-income families experiencing any 
positive or negative externalities from these private school transactions?   
Because public and private schools provide substitutable educational goods, it 
follows that there is some degree of competition between the two.  The purpose of this 
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study is to investigate this implied competition between public and private schools, to 
provide some evidence of whether that competition is a source of externalities for 
surrounding public schools, and how long it might be before changes take place at the 
public level. 
Higher degrees of competition from private schools could affect surrounding 
public schools in several ways.  Sorting may take place among the schools in that 
students with specific qualities move away from public schools and into private schools, 
changing the make-up of student populations.  This change in student populations will 
likely affect the average test scores of public schools. The change in enrollment and test 
scores is somewhat indicative of a high degree of competition, which could induce public 
schools to increase the quality of education they offer.  My results suggest that there are 
some positive externalities for public schools as a result of private markets for education; 
however, it takes many years for public school students to benefit from them.   
While this study offers evidence for a positive effect on public achievement in the 
long-run, the short-run effect private schools have on their public counterparts is unclear.  
One plausible explanation for the lagged adjustment in public school quality is that it 
takes time for public schools to detect higher levels of competition as well as time to 
respond by increasing the quality of education offered.  So, the remaining public school 
students benefit in the form of measures taken by the public school that lead to better test 
scores.  But, since these measures are not taken immediately and may vary in degree, test 
scores in the short-run are unlikely to show perceptible changes in one direction for all 
affected schools. Assuming that test scores are a legitimate measure of educational 
 7
quality, I find that public school students get a better quality education in the long-run 
due in part to the existence of a free market for education. 
In the following section, a review of literature on the subject of competition 
between these two types of schools is provided.  Section III describes the empirical 
specification used as well as supporting literature for this specification and Section IV 
provides a detailed description of data and expected signs on the coefficients.  Section V 
discusses the estimation techniques used and the results produced with those techniques.  
The final section provides concluding remarks and offers ideas for future research.  All 
summary statistics and estimation results are provided in Appendix A. 
 
II. Review of Literature 
 
When public school students switch to private school, there could be a number of 
reasons why.  But, traditionally it is thought that switching mostly occurs because the 
student is of high ability and is unchallenged in public school.  If so, this would leave a 
pool of low and high ability, low-income students left in the public school.  Epple and 
Romano formulated a theoretical model of this equilibrium in student populations among 
public and private schools in the presence of a voucher system.
 2
   
They allowed students to differ in abilities, where the high ability students have 
increased educational success and provide a positive effect on the educational successes 
of peers.  They allowed households to differ by income and measured school quality by 
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 Dennis Epple and Richard E. Romano,   “Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and 
Peer-Group Effects,”   The American Economic Review 88,   no. 1 (1998):  33-62. 
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the mean ability of the student population.  Each household is assumed to have one 
student of ability, b, and household utility is a function of consumption and the 
educational attainment of the student.  In equilibrium, the authors found that student 
types will be sorted by income and ability across tax-financed public schools and tuition-
financed private schools.  The authors found a Pareto efficient outcome with the 
existence of only private schools, which practice price discrimination among students.  In 
the private school equilibrium, high-ability, low-income students are subsidized by high-
income students in the form of scholarships and tuition discounts. 
3
  
Allowing for public provision of education in the model, a Pareto efficient 
equilibrium no longer existed as public schools cannot price discriminate.  When 
introducing a voucher system into the model, the authors found that as the size of the 
school voucher increased, the mean ability in public schools decreased because of the 
sorting of high ability students into private schools.  One drawback of this model is that 
public and private schools are assumed to provide a homogeneous level of education and 
school quality depends only on the ability of its mean student.  But, this does give some 
theoretical basis for how students will be sorted among public and private schools as well 
as information on how a voucher system might affect student populations in the face of 
competition from private schools.
4
  
Many economists have tackled the subject of public vs. private schooling and why 
the two sometimes produce vastly different results.  Some empirical evidence provided 
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 Epple and Romano,   “Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group 




by Sander investigated the effects that attending a Catholic school has on the test scores 
of non-Hispanic whites attending Catholic schools. He showed that for a particular data 
cohort, 8 years in a Catholic grade school is associated with higher math, reading and 
vocabulary scores, and that this result is not due to the selection of extraordinary students 
by the Catholic schools.  He claims that this “Catholic school effect” is due to non-
Catholics who attend Catholic schools, which would suggest ability sorting among non-
Catholic students as well as the positive “peer effects” shown in the Epple and Romano 
model.
 5
   
The empirical economic literature on the subject of competitive effects between 
public and private schools has produced differing opinions on the subject.  Some studies 
find that there is no private market effect on public schools, or that the effect is washed 
out by other factors.  Other results have concluded that public schools actually do change 
their behavior when faced with competition from private schools.  Yet, I was unable to 
find one that explored the possibility that public schools do not adjust to competition 
immediately.  All studies thus far have focused on the immediate effects of competition. 
Sander went on to analyze the effect that private schools in Illinois have on 
neighboring public school performance by looking at school-level data in 1996.  In this 
paper, he used county-level Catholic population densities as an instrumental variable for 
the percentage of students in private school.  Private school enrollment has been thought 
to be endogenous to public school achievement since theory predicts that there will be a 
greater demand for private schools where public school achievement does not meet 
                                                 
5
 William Sander,   “Catholic Grade Schools and Academic Achievement,”   The Journal of Human 
Resources 33 (1996):  540-548. 
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parental expectations.  For his measure of public school achievement, he uses IGAP 
(Illinois Goal Assessment Program) test scores.  Accounting for many family, school and 
community background factors, Sander concluded that there is no private school effect on 
current test scores in public schools.  He claimed that there may be two opposing effects 
leading to a net effect of zero.  First, the superior students may be leaving public school 
for private school, decreasing the average student quality in public schools.  This idea of 
“cream-skimming” occurs when the smartest and most advantaged students leave public 
schools for private ones.  Second, the increase in competition from private schools may 
be forcing the public schools to provide a better education. 
6
  
 Hoxby came to a very different conclusion.  The advantage of her paper is 
that she used county-level data across all the U.S. states to test the same effect, while 
tackling the idea of cream-skimming.
 
To measure the success of public schools, Hoxby 
used the highest grade completed by age 24.  She also recognized the possibility that 
private school enrollment is endogenous to public school performance, so she used 
Catholic population shares, densities and church densities as instrumental variables for 
private enrollment.  Holding other variables such as per-pupil spending in private and 
public schools and teacher salary constant, she found that private school competition 
lowers total public school spending.  Also, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of 
county secondary enrollment in Catholic schools increases public school students’ 
educational achievement by .33 years and wages by 2%.  So, if the quality of education in 
public schools is increasing because of competitive pressures, parents of public school 
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 William Sander,   “Private Schools and Public School Achievement,” The Journal of Human Resources 
34 (1999):  697-709. 
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She also included empirical work to show that these estimated improvements are 
not due to the sorting, or cream-skimming, of students between public and private 
schools.  She accounted for the difference between changes in the student population and 
changes in public school behavior by comparing coefficients on Catholic private school 
enrollment.  She reported estimated IV coefficients for enrollment in Catholic schools 
using three different dependent variables:  1) highest grade completed by age 24, 2) 




She first included only public school students in these three dependent variable 
measures when estimating the coefficients for Catholic school enrollment.  She then 
estimated the Catholic school enrollment coefficients again including both public and 
private school students in the three dependent variable measures.  She found that the 
results when using only public school students were not significantly different from the 
results that lump public and private students together.  So, the coefficients on Catholic 
school enrollment were not affected by the sorting of students. This suggests that there 
are both low and high ability, low-income students benefiting from competition since not 
all high ability students are sorted into private school.
9
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She noted that if public schools respond to surrounding private school 
competition, they will most likely raise quality and not reduce taxes to keep quality 
constant.  Reducing taxes would allow parents more income with which to spend on 
private school tuition.  She also showed that when parents have fewer public schools to 
choose from, the expense of public schools within a school district as measured by tax 
dollars spent per school increases.  Parents who live in a particular school district may be 
mandated to choose from public schools only within that district and there may be few, or 
in some cases only one, public school to choose from.  This increases enrollment in 
private schools and decreases the educational attainment of those remaining in public 
schools.  These results provide some empirical evidence of the theoretical results of 
Epple and Romano where increased enrollment in private schools decreases the student 
quality of public schools.
10
 
 In addition, Hoxby showed evidence that teachers’ unions are stronger and more 
prevalent in areas with weak competition among public schools.  Weak competition 
among public schools implies there are fewer choices of public schools for students in a 
particular district, or in other words, when the switching costs from one public school to 
another are high.  If parents are mandated to send their children to particular public 
schools based on school districts and there are few to choose from, the costs of switching 
to public schools outside the district will include moving from one district to another.
11
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Several other authors have found conflicting results on the competitive effects 




, Geller et al
14







, and Smith and Meier
18
 all used county-level data from various states to test this 
effect.    Most only used OLS to estimate this effect and ignored any possible 
endogeneity from private school measures.  The findings were varied in sign and 
significance.   Couch et al found a positive significant effect using only OLS, while Dee 
found a positive significant effect only when using an IV approach.  The other authors all 
found insignificant effects that were varied in sign.  All used some form of standardized 
test scores as their measurements of public school achievement, with the exception of 





, and Simon and Lovrich
21
.  Arum used state-level data, while 
Simon and Lovrich used district-level data.  Both papers used only OLS approaches and 
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 J.F. Couch, W.F. Shughart and A.L. Williams, “Private School Enrollment and Public School 
Performance,” Public Choice 76 (1993):  301-312. 
13
 T.S. Dee, “Competition and the Quality of Public Schools,” Economics of Education Review 17 (1998):   
419-427. 
14
 C.R. Geller, D.L. Sjoquist and M.B. Walker,  “The Effect of Private School Competition on 
Public School Performance,” National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education Occasional Paper 
No. 15 (2001). 
15
 R. Maranto, S. Milliman and S. Stevens.  “Does Private School Competition Harm Public 
Schools?  Revisiting Smith and Meier’s ‘The Case Against School Choice’,” Political Research Quarterly 
53 (2000):  177-192. 
16
 C.M. Newmark,  “Another Look at Whether Private Schools Influence Public School Quality,” 
Public Choice 82 (1995):  365-373. 
17
 Tim R. Sass, The effects of private school competition on public school performance:  does 
the type of competitor matter?,  Florida State University, unpublished manuscript, (2001). 
18
 K.B. Smith and K.J. Meier, “Public Choice in Education:  Markets and the Demand for Quality 
Education,” Political Research Quarterly 48 (1995):  461-478. 
19
 R. Arum, “Do Private Schools Force Public Schools to Compete?,” American Sociological 
Review 16 (1996):  29-46. 
20
 Patrick Bayer and Robert McMillan,  “Choice and Competition in Local Education Markets,”  
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 11802 (2005). 
21
 C.A. Simon and N.P Lovrich, Jr.,  “Private School enrollment and Public School Performance:  
Assessing the Effects of Competition Upon Public School Student Achievement in Washington State,” 
Policy Studies Journal 24 (1996):  666-675.  
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found positive coefficients on their private school measures, yet they were insignificant.  
Bayer and McMillan chose metropolitan-level data and found significant positive 
coefficients for their private school measures.
22
 
Jepsen noted that the estimated effect of private school competition on public 
school achievement varies largely due to the choice of the data set, the dependent 
variable used to measure public school achievement, the level of aggregation used for the 
private competition measure, and whether an OLS or IV approach is used.  He used two 
data sets with differing levels of aggregation, grade ranges and measures of public school 
achievement to show that the coefficient on the private competition measure can vary.  
The coefficients ranged in magnitude, sign and significance, but when coefficients were 
significantly related to the public school measure of achievement, they were positive.  He 
also tried both OLS and IV approaches using various specifications and various measures 
of Catholic population as the instrumental variable for his measure of private school 
competition, percent of students attending private school.
23
   
Looking at the previous literature on this subject, it seems that there is great 
variation in the estimation of this private school effect.  There does not seem to be an 
overwhelming majority opinion that private school enrollment is positively or negatively 
related to public school achievement.  Given that this question still seems to be open, 
testing to see if the effects are lagged may prove useful in unveiling the relationship 
between public school achievement and private school enrollment.  
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III. Empirical Specification 
 
Lazear thought of education as a good that individuals both consume and produce.  
An individual may enjoy the process of learning as a pure consumption good, but may 
increase the production of his education for the purposes of sale.  The sale of education 
would take place in the form of higher wages for more highly educated individuals.  In 
any case, Lazear showed that an individual’s production of education will depend on 
attributes such as ability and parental factors, but one cannot separate the amount of 
education demanded for pure consumption from the amount of education demanded for 
wealth purposes, because they are joint products of education.  In short, variables which 
affect an individual’s production of education, regardless of the intent of that production, 
will also affect the quality of public schooling.
 24
   
Hoxby used a production function for education from a school achievement 
perspective.  The production of achievement involves some inputs provided by the school 
itself or the surrounding educational market, others by the students and their parents, 
others are exogenous to the model and some of the output will remain unexplained due to 
unobservable inputs.
25
  Below, public school achievement is defined as a production 
function for education in the spirit of Hoxby and Lazear: 
 
(1)              Yijt = Xit β1 + Sijt β2 + Pijt β3 + Eit β4 + Eit-1 β5 + πijt +µ ijt + εijt 
                                                 
24
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Where, Yijt represents public school achievement or output, Xit is a vector of educational 
market characteristics, Sijt is a vector of school characteristics, Pijt is a vector of parental 
characteristics, Eit is enrollment in private schools, πijt is a vector of unobservable inputs, 
µ ijt is a school specific error term and εijt is an individual specific error term.  The indexes 
are as follows:  j is for the school, i is for the market and t is for time.   
There are two terms for the variable of interest, private school enrollment: current 
enrollment (t) and enrollment in the previous time period (t-1). It is likely that enrollment 
in private schools in time period (t-1) will have some effect on public school output since 
public institutions must first detect some kind of signal that they are “losing the 
competition.”  Since they cannot necessarily measure this in lost profits, two plausible 
signals that they are in a more competitive environment might be a decline in enrollment 
and lower test scores.  Enrollment is likely to decline gradually rather than all at once 
because parents must first seek out information regarding the relative qualities of 
alternative education if they are unhappy with public school education.  Parents will have 
different preferences when it comes to educational quality and they will have different 
search costs.  So, after a gradual decline in public school enrollment, the public school 
will begin to notice a trend and then eventually react.    Test scores are a more immediate 
signal of the current level of quality, but it seems likely that a trend of declining test 
scores would provoke more reaction than declining enrollment and infrequently low test 
scores. 
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There must be some lag in the information available to public schools that signal 
it to change behavior.  There must also be some lag between the signal and the actual 
change in quality.  In order to give students a better opportunity to succeed, schools will 
need to hire better quality teachers, order updated textbooks, and provide better 
technology, ect. So, realistically, the public school will not respond to a competitive 
signal in the same period the signal was received and even more unlikely that public test 
scores will show improvement in that same period.  They may have a chance to respond 
partially, but the full effect of those efforts probably will not show up immediately.  To 
account for any kind of partial response to increased competition, I have included current 
observations in time period (t) for private school enrollment as an explanatory variable 
for public school test scores.  Various lag lengths are also explored to investigate when 
the effects of a public response show up. 
Unlike previous studies, this paper explores the possibility that public schools 
may need time to adjust to higher levels of competition from surrounding private schools.  
To explore this relationship empirically, I have used county-level panel data for 
California from 58 counties over the years 1999-2005.
26
  As Hoxby notes, county-level 
data are advantageous because narrow market definitions, like school districts, may give 
biased estimates due to self-selection into better school districts.  Broad market 
definitions, like states, are not likely to capture competitive effects as a private school on 
one side of the state is unlikely to compete with a public school on the other side of the 
state.  County-level data are obviously not a perfect market definition, but they should 
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adequately avoid the problems associated with market definitions that are too narrow or 
too broad.
27
   
To measure public school achievement, I used standardized test scores from the 
API (Academic Performance Index) exam, which is given only in California.  There are 
some problems with using standardized test scores to measure public school performance. 
Kane and Staiger showed that school-level average test score data can be noisy and 
distorted for many reasons, especially for smaller schools.
 28
   
For example, distortions in school-level data may stem from the reality that much 
of the improvement in a school’s average test score can be transitory and there are some 
factors that are out of the school’s control.  Also, test scores may be an incomplete 
measurement of a school’s output as different schools may use varied subjects for their 
tests.
29
  The test score data used in this study account for many of the problems 
associated with this type of data.  Averaging scores to the county-level should help the 
sometimes extreme variation in annual scores for smaller schools with fewer test score 
observations.  The data set used in this paper should also better reflect school output 
across counties since the API scores are for the same subjects across all schools and the 
model aims to account for many factors that are out of a school’s control.  
Though test scores are not a perfect measure of public school achievement, they 
are likely to be the measurement by which parents and schools determine how well the 
public school is doing.  If so, as a child’s test scores decrease his parents may become 
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more likely to send him to private school. Of course the school itself may be motivated to 
change based on its relative performance compared to all other schools.  In addition, 
higher budgets and bonuses are typically awarded to public schools that have shown 
improvement and are performing relatively better than other public schools on 
standardized tests.  Because parents and schools are likely to use test scores to compare 
schools and many of the limitations of test scores as a measurement of achievement are 
addressed, they should provide a relatively adequate measure of public school 
achievement. 
Educational market characteristics were accounted for by using county average 
demographic measures including racial population homogeneity, the percent of public 
schools that are middle schools, the percent of public schools that are high schools, and 
two interaction terms where average public enrollment is multiplied by a dummy variable 
for both middle and high schools.  Racial population homogeneity was included to 
control for the fact that the more homogenous a population, the more likely the public 
school will meet parental expectations; whereas, populations with distinctly differing 
groups will likely be able to support several private schools that match the parental 
expectations of each group.  This will affect the degree to which public schools are 
efficiently matched to parental expectations and the competitiveness of private schools.  
The percentages of public schools that are middle and high schools and the two 
interaction terms should account for the age of students taking the exam and how much 
enrollment varies across schools.   
 20
To account for school characteristics, I used the percentage of teachers having full 
teaching credentials, student race percentages, public school enrollment, the variance of 
public school enrollment, and the percent of students that are on a state-provided meal 
plan.  The percentage of teachers have full teaching credentials measures teacher quality 
across counties and more qualified teachers will have a positive effect on the 
performance of students as shown by Tamura.
30
  Ideally, spending per pupil would be 
included as an additional school characteristic measure. Unfortunately, data on spending 
per pupil by county were not reported, but using county fixed effects should help control 
for the unreported data. 
The educational attainment of parents plays an important role in school 
performance as parents with higher levels of education are expected to make education a 
priority for their children.  Therefore, I have included the average educational attainment 
of the parents of test takers as a measure of parental input.  This measure is the average 
educational attainment of the parents of students taking the exams, not the average 
educational attainment for the entire county.  Consequently, this should more accurately 
capture differences in parental input for public school children across counties.   The 
variables of interest, current and lagged private school enrollment, are meant to measure 
the degree of competition public schools face from surrounding private schools.  Current 
private enrollment values have been used in previous studies on this subject, but lagged 
values have not been explored.  These variables are explained in detail in the next sub-
section.    
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IV. Detailed Data Description 
 
The API (Academic Performance Index) standardized test is given only in 
California and has been given to all public school students in grades 2-12 every year 
since 1999. The scores range from 200-1000 and include multiple content areas 
depending on the subjects the Department of Education mandates should be covered in a 
specific grade.  But, the topics covered in each grade are uniform across schools.  The 
performance of each student is converted to points on the API scale and these points are 
then averaged across all students within a school for all subjects; therefore, student-level 
scores were not available. All schools are required to report school scores averaged 
across all students with minimal exception.  I have taken scores for all schools within 
each county and calculated an enrollment-weighted county-level average to measure 
public school achievement across counties. This variable should be able to capture the 
relative county performance of California’s public schools while controlling for the 
relative differences in school size within a county. 
 Not only are average API scores reported for every public school in California, 
but students also report their races and the average education of their parents.  The 
average education of the parents of test takers is measured as follows:  0 = No High 
school degree, 1 = High school degree, 2 = Some college, 3 = College degree, 4 = 
Graduate degree. In addition, schools report their percentage of teachers with full 
teaching credentials.  California full teaching credentials include certifications such as 




  Teaching credentials seem to be the best reported measure to 
capture teacher quality within each county.   
Data on API score, enrollment, the race of test takers, average parental education, 
percentage of students on a state-provided meal plan and teaching credentials were 
collected from the California Department of Education.
32
  All school-level data, including 
the API score, teaching credentials, parental education, percentage of students on meal 
plan and test-taker race variables, were weighted by school enrollment and then averaged 




 graders for all public schools 
within each county.  I have pooled elementary, middle and high school students because 
data on lagged private enrollment includes all three school types in the observation.  
Moreover, I have controlled for the percentage of public middle and high school students 
in the model.  Controlling for the age cohort of students not only aids in providing 
information on how test scores are affected by the age of the students, it also helps to 
correct for any weighting done by the California Department of Education on the school-
level API scores.  These scores are weighted differently for elementary and middle/high 
school students, so including dummy variables for school type and percentages of middle 
and high school students help to correct for these previous weights.  More information 
can be found on the calculation of API scores at the California Department of 
Education’s website.
33
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Two variables will be used to estimate the private school effect on public school 
performance.  The percentage of total county enrollment that is private (percent private) 
will be used to measure any immediate effects from competition; this measure is similar 
to those used in previous studies.  To capture lagged effects, some measure of past 
private competition must be used.  The only data available on private schools prior to 
1999 in California are enrollment by county for the years 1980 and 1990.  Since it is 
possible that private school enrollment in 1980 has little if any discernable effect on 
public school performance during the years 1999-2005, I have provided models both 
including and excluding 1980 private enrollment.  While these are certainly not perfect 
measures, data limitations prevented me from using lagged data between 1991 and 1998.  
What these measures will do is say something about how private enrollment has affected 
public school test scores some ten to twenty years later.   
An advantage of using such a long lag is that it seems reasonable that the effect 
private schools have on public schools will not only take some time to become apparent, 
but that public schools will also need adjustment time once the effect becomes noticeable.  
For example, if a public school begins to decline in quality it is unlikely that students will 
leave immediately.  What is more realistic is that a small segment of parents may pull 
their children out of public school in the middle of the year, and then a larger segment 
may pull their children out after the end of the school year, and so on.  This effect should 
compound over time until eventually enough students have switched to private school 
that it becomes apparent to the public school that something needs to be done to increase 
the quality of public education.  Because parents are more likely to gradually take their 
 24
children out of public school, the immediate private school effect is probably less 
pronounced than the lagged private effect.  Data on past private enrollment (1990 and 
1980) were obtained from Counting California.
 34
 
Other variables included in the model are the percentage of students on a state-
provided meal plan, test taker race variables and controls for population homogeneity and 
percentages of public enrollment that are middle and high school students.  The 
percentage of students on a meal plan should control for the differences in test scores 
across low and high income students.  County level race variables were used to calculate 
Herfindahl indices to measure the racial population homogeneity of each county. County 
level population and race data were obtained from the California Department of 
Finance.
35
  This project is part of the ongoing research of the Regional Economic 
Measurement Division of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  Summary statistics 
are provided in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 of Appendix A. 
The a priori sign expectations for the coefficients on current private enrollment 
and private enrollment in 1990 are somewhat difficult to pin down.  The coefficients for 
the average education of parents and teacher quality measures should both be positive.  I 
expect that parents with more education will make education a priority for their children 
as well and high quality teachers are likely to induce students to put forth more effort 
than low quality teachers.  Since parents with more education tend to have higher 
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incomes, I expect that counties with higher percentages of students on meal plans will 
have lower test scores than counties with fewer students on meal plans.  
  
V. Estimation Technique  
 
Mapping school level results to county level results 
Much of the data used in this study was actually reported as the school-level 
average rather than the county-level average.  The exceptions were past levels of private 
enrollment, number of schools, variance of public enrollment and county racial 
population homogeneity.  Because the county level seems the most appropriate market 
definition and the variables of interest are only reported at the county level, I have 
aggregated these school-level variables to the county level and weighted the appropriate 
variables by school enrollment.  Since there may be some potential problems in this 
aggregation, I have provided a school-level model as a means of mapping the school 
level results to the county level to further support aggregation as reasonable means of 
market definition and estimation technique.  Summary statistics of school-level variables 
are provided in Table 2.3 and county-level variables are provided in Table 2.2 of 
Appendix A.   
The empirical specification for the school-level model was set up exactly like the 
county-level model discussed in Section III with the natural log of the school’s average 
test score as the dependent variable; however, the variables reported only at the county 
level were omitted from the school level model.  OLS was used to estimate this model 
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and the results are reported in Table 2.4 of Appendix A.  All coefficients were significant 
at the 5% level and year fixed effects were incorporated to account for the use of panel 
data over the years 1999-2005.   
To compare the coefficients of interest for private enrollment between the school 
and county levels, residuals were obtained from the school-level model in Table 2.4.  
These residuals were then weighted by school enrollment, averaged to the county level 
and used as the dependent variable in the model provided in Table 2.5 of Appendix A.  
Because the dependent variable was originally logged in the school level equation, using 
the weighed residuals as the dependent variable and the natural log of the independent 
variables makes the specification in Table 2.5 a log-log specification and allows the 
coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities.  The residuals came from the natural log of 
test scores, so there is no need to use the natural log of residuals in the specification in 
Table 2.5.  To map the private enrollment measures between school and county, private 
enrollment observations from 1990, 1980 and current observations of private enrollment 
were used as explanatory variables for the residuals from the school level model in Table 
2.4.  In addition, the number of schools in the county, variance of public school 
enrollment and county racial population homogeneity were also used to help explain the 
unexplained portion of the school level model.   A discussion comparing the school level 





Aggregated county level results 
In order to obtain county level estimation results, the appropriate school level 
variables were weighted by enrollment before aggregating them to the county level.  
Those variables included test scores, parental education, teacher quality, percent of 
students on a meal plan and race variables.  After aggregating to the county level, the 
empirical specification discussed in Section III was used to obtain OLS estimation results 
as provided in Table 2.9.  The specification for this OLS model used the natural log of 
the enrollment-weighted test score as the dependent variable.  Similarly, the independent 
variables used in the school-level model in Table 2.4 were all accounted for in these 
county level models, including both year and county fixed effects. 
As shown in Table 2.9, the independent variable measures of private enrollment, 
population homogeneity, number of schools and the variance of public enrollment were 
included as explanatory variables for county average test scores.  To compare the 
coefficients obtained in the school-level model and the averaged enrollment-weighted 
residuals model with the county averaged enrollment-weighted test scores, the same 
explanatory variables were accounted for in each.   
I have compared the OLS coefficients obtained using county average data with 
the coefficients obtained using school-level data and the residuals from the school-level 
model in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.  With a few exceptions, the coefficients across school and 
county levels have consistency in their signs.  The coefficients of interest are provided in 
Table 2.8; OLS was used to estimate the coefficients on these private enrollment 
variables.   
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The coefficients on private enrollment in 1990 are positively related to both 
county average test scores and the county average residuals from the school level model, 
they are both significant at the 5% level regardless of whether private enrollment in 1980 
was included in the model.  The same is true regarding significance and sign on the 
coefficients for 1980 private enrollment.  The coefficient on 1990 private enrollment 
becomes insignificant for the residuals model when 1980 private enrollment is included, 
but remains significant in the county average test score model.  The coefficients on 
current private enrollment vary in sign and significance; the differences in coefficients for 
private enrollment are discussed in the next sub-section.  
Because the observations for both 1990 and 1980 private enrollment are repeated 
for each of the 6 years in the panel in both the county average test score model and the 
residuals model, the errors are clustered by county with a White’s correction for 
heteroskedasticity.   Because year fixed effects were accounted for in the school level 
model, only county fixed effects were accounted for in this residual county level model.  
County and year fixed effects were accounted for in the county level test score model.   
This mapping from a school level model to a county level model provides some 
evidence that there are not massive problems in aggregating to the county level.  So, if we 
look at the OLS county level model in Table 2.9 we can see similar results to those of the 
school level model.  The coefficients on current observations of private enrollment and 
on private enrollment in 1990 and 1980 provide evidence that the effects of competition 
are lagged.  Both coefficients on 1990 and 1980 private enrollment are positive and 
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significantly related to current observations of public test scores for both the residuals 
county level model and the test score county model. 
The results indicate that higher private enrollment in 1990 and in 1980 in a 
particular county led to public school students in that county performing better on 
standardized test scores through the years 1999-2005. If higher test scores today are in 
part results of higher private enrollment in the past it would seem to indicate that public 
schools do eventually respond to competitive pressures.  A discussion of the instrumental 
variables (IV) approach used for both the residuals model in Table 2.6 and Table 2.10 
follows in the next sub-section. 
 
VI.  Estimation Results 
 
There are likely some endogeneity problems in using OLS to estimate the model, 





noted in the aforementioned studies private enrollment is potentially endogenous to 
public school achievement.  Here, current private enrollment has the potential to be a 
choice variable for current observations.  In other words, it is possible that parents are 
choosing to send their children to private school because the public school is failing to 
meet parental expectations.  As with previous studies, this endogeneity can be corrected 
by using the county-level Catholic population percentages as an instrument for current 
observations of private school enrollment.   
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 Table 2.1:  Private School Enrollment by Denomination for California and the US 
 
 
The intuition behind this instrument is that Catholic schools make up the largest 
percentage denomination of all private schools in the U.S. and parents are likely to send 
their children to Catholic school based on family religious preferences.  The percentage 
of Catholic private schools in California is actually higher than the national average, as 
shown in Table 2.1 above, making Catholic population per county a reasonable 
instrument to explore.    
Table 2.6 in Appendix A provides coefficients from the residuals model where 
current observations of private enrollment are instrumented with Catholic population 
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Percent of California Private 
School Enrollment 2003-200438 




Catholic 37.6% 27.9% 
Secular 20.8% 24.0% 
Religious (Non-church affiliated) 15.2% 14.0% 
Baptist 4.3% 7.7% 
Lutheran  4.3% 6.0% 
Assembly of God 2.4% 1.5% 
Seventh-Day Adventist 2.3% 3.4% 
Episcopal 1.6% 1.2% 
Calvinist 1.2% 0.5% 
Jewish 1.2% 2.9% 
Church of Christ 0.6% 0.6% 
Pentecostal 0.5% 1.4% 
Other Religious (Church affiliated) 8.1% 9.0% 
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percentages.  The coefficients for 1990 and 1980 continue to remain positive and 
significantly related to the unexplained portion of the school level model, providing 
further evidence for lagged competitive effects; however, current observations for private 
enrollment, once instrumented, are insignificant. 
Table 2.10 provides a county-level model with the natural log of test scores as the 
dependent variables.  In this model, current observations of private enrollment are 
instrumented using Catholic population percentages.  Again, current observations of 
private enrollment are measured by the variable percent private.  The coefficient is 
insignificant in the IV county test score models for both the fixed effects and non-fixed 
effects specifications.  Judging from the varied outcomes of this coefficient from 
previous studies and from the results discussed in the last sub-section, it seems that the 
immediate private enrollment effect on public school performance is unclear.  As shown 
by Jepsen, depending on the data set, the aggregation level, the measure of public school 
performance and the estimation technique, the significance and sign on this coefficient 
varies quite a bit.
40
   
A possible explanation of the variation in the immediate private enrollment effect 
may be that the ability-type of the students leaving public school varies, leaving mixed 
results for the mean ability of students remaining in public schools.  Hoxby provided 
some evidence that not all high ability students are sorted out of public school.  Some 
counties may have more behavioral disorder students leaving for a military-like private 
school, whereas other counties may have more high ability students leaving in order to 
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feel more academically challenged in a private school with a reputation for high 
educational quality.
41
  On the other hand, there may be low-ability, high-income students 
leaving for private school based on parental preferences.   
Whatever the reason for the decrease in public enrollment, the mean ability of the 
students remaining in public schools may be varied and schools may not immediately 
react by hiring higher quality teachers or ordering better textbooks.  This process is likely 
to take some time in addition to the time it takes to realize that students are leaving public 
schools in favor of private ones and/or that the mean student ability had decreased.  So, 
test scores in the same year as the rise in private enrollment could go either way, or could 
be initially unaffected. 
The lack of better instruments could be the cause of the insignificance among the 
coefficients in the IV model in Table 2.10.  Because the independent variables in this 
model are indeed related to public school performance in both the school level/residuals 
and county level OLS models, the IV model may benefit from the exploration of other 
instruments for current observations of private enrollment.    
 
Investigation of shorter lags 
To further investigate the effects of private school enrollment on public school 
performance, I have included OLS coefficients for one, two, three and four year lags on 
private enrollment in Table 2.11 of Appendix A.  The purpose of this analysis was to see 
if public schools are affected to the point of reaction by competitive pressures one, two, 
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three or four years later.  This limits the number of observations available since data on 
recent private enrollment only covers the years 1999-2005, so longer lags have fewer 
observations in the panel;  therefore, there would be too few observations for lags longer 
than four years.  I included each lag in place of private enrollment (t) in the same period 
and used the same specifications shown in Table 2.9.   
The results were mixed in sign and were all insignificant, suggesting that the 
effects of more private competition on public school test scores are unclear or 
insignificant up to four years later.  It seems that these results provide additional evidence 
that immediate competitive effects are unclear because public schools take time to notice 
the effect and then adjust.   The coefficients are negative for the one-year lag and then 
become positive the longer the lag, which may indicate that students leave, then test 
scores decline and eventually rise after the public school quality level is increased.  Yet, 
the effects remain insignificant and further research is needed to identify if this 
relationship is indeed negative for a period of time and then becomes positive.  




 If the evidence in the analysis of this chapter is correct, private educational 
markets do provide some positive externalities for students remaining in public schools; 
however, these externalities do not seem to appear until many years later.  While public 
schools may lack the same financial incentives as private schools to provide quality 
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education, they do respond to competition from private schools which offer substitutable 
educational goods.  This is certainly not to say that all public schools provide a lower 
quality education than their private school neighbors; it may be quite the opposite.  What 
this study implies is that public schools react when private schools begin to attract a 
larger customer base and both low and high ability, low-income students enrolled in 
public schools will eventually benefit from this private market effect.   
Of course these results may be limited to California, but they do shed some light 
on the problem of identifying the existence and timing of a private school effect on public 
school performance.  If more competition does indeed increase public school quality, it is 
possible that eventually fewer parents will pay for private school.  As with any positive 
externality, less than the socially efficient amount of private schooling may be consumed 
if public school students receive benefits from other students paying to switch to private 
schools.  But, if the increased quality in public schooling takes long enough to show up, 
then future public school students will benefit from former students paying to send a 
signal that induces public school quality changes.  I hope to explore this subject further as 
more data are available through the California Department of Education and other 
sources. 
The use of an extensive data set will promote accuracy, and in future research I 
also hope to explore different lags of private enrollment to help explain public school 
performance.  It has yet to be determined what the exact signal for public school change 
might be.  Do public schools react to higher levels of competition from private schools 
because of decreased test scores, which imply lower mean student ability within the 
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public school?  Or, do they respond to gradually decreasing levels of enrollment?  
Research on additional lags may help answer these questions.   
Further research should also be done with various levels of aggregation across the 
U.S. in order to obtain more exact estimates of the existence of a private school effect.  
As data become available, it would also be informative to look at other measures for 
public school achievement and for the private school effect.  In any case, it is informative 
to look at this effect with the notion that public institutions in general do not have the 
same incentives as private institutions and are therefore unlikely to respond to 
competition as quickly or maybe not at all.  Simply recognizing this likelihood in future 
analysis may give us a better understanding of public school behavior in the face of 
private market competition.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SETTINGS THAT FOSTER INTEREST GROUP 
FORMATION ACROSS US STATES 
 
I. Introduction 
Economic research has shed a great deal of light on the functions and objectives of 
interest groups as well as how they go about attaining those objectives.  Welch provided 
evidence that interest groups tend to contribute to the likely winner in order to gain 
political favor once the candidate is elected rather than contributing to candidates 
specifically to sway a political outcome.
42
  Interest groups have been thought to serve 
many roles in the political process.  Epstein and O’Halloran described how they may aid 
in the provision of information to policy makers on certain issues; however, this 
information may be biased towards the group’s objective.
43
  Work by Austen-Smith 
proposed a theoretical model of how interest groups can help determine the policy 
positions of legislators based on how large their campaign contributions are.
44
 
Many authors have studied how interest groups are related to numerous political 
facets, but few have empirically uncovered the settings that foster interest group 
formation in the first place.  There are a handful of authors who have tackled this subject 
using cross-country approaches, but few have used U.S. state-level data.  Presumably the 
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problem with state level data is that states are too empirically close in aspects such as 
political systems and levels of stability.  However, if Mancur Olson’s predictions about 
institutional sclerosis are correct, more interest group activity is stifling to economic 
growth.
 45
  If this is true, it is important to know the environment that lends itself to more 
interest groups as related to U.S. states in order to further explain income and growth 
differences.   
Bischoff states that Olson’s
46
 theory consists of a chain with three elements: “First, 
the number of interest groups in a country increases with the duration of its political 
stability.  Second, interest group activities have a negative influence on economic growth.  
Third, the overall influence of interest groups increases with their number.”
 47
  Since U.S. 
states have similar levels of political stability, there must be other factors at work causing 
differences in their numbers of interest groups.  This chapter explores those other factors 
in an attempt to uncover the first element in the chain for U.S. states.   In this study I have 
employed similar methods from cross-country studies to test other factors besides 
political stability in order to determine which ones are important in explaining interest 
group formation across U.S. states.  
 
II.  Review of Literature 
Cross-country studies should provide a reasonable background and starting point for 
explaining differences in group formation in the states.  All of the following papers use 
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trade associations as the dependent variable measure for number of interest groups in a 
given country or region.     
Peter Murrell has looked at this problem from two angles.  Murrell first used non-
governmental trade associations to measure interest groups for 24 OECD countries.  As 
explanatory variables for how the numbers of associations vary across countries, he 
included population, measures of political systems, size and structure of government, 
socioeconomic development and diversity.  He found that population, decentralization of 
government and lengths of time of modernization are all positive and significant 
determinants of numbers of interest groups.  Measures of democracy were not important 
in determining the number of groups, but measures of socioeconomic development were 
somewhat important.  Due to the lack of observations in Murrell’s study and the large 
number of explanatory variables, he used simple correlations and step-wise regression 
methods to support these results.
48
 
Kennelly and Murrell looked at a cross section of 75 industries in 10 countries to see 
how numbers of interest groups vary based on industrial and political characteristics.  
Their measure of interest groups includes only the trade associations within each 
industry.  Because some industries have zero interest groups, resulting in a truncated 
dependent variable, they used a Tobit analysis.  This analysis is unique in that it used 
industrial-level data across countries rather than aggregated country-level data. Various 
measures of the costs and benefits of forming trade associations as well as country-
specific characteristics were included as explanatory variables. The authors proposed that 
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opposition to trade organizations will come from the buyers of that industry’s output and 
from foreign competition.  They found that more trade associations are established in 
industries that feel threatened by consumer and foreign competitor opposition.  That is, 
the larger the proportion of an industry’s output bought by households and the more 
imports/exports in an industry, the more trade associations that will result.
49
 
To capture the demand for trade associations among industries, they included labor’s 
share of output, elasticity of demand for the industry’s product, and the four-firm 
concentration ratio in the industry. The greater labor’s share of output, the more likely 
labor is to lobby for government assistance; and, the greater the number of firms in an 
industry, the larger the need for government assistance through lobbying.  Trade 
associations are also more likely to form when demand is inelastic because price 
increases increase industry revenues.  The authors also included some country specific 
explanatory variables such as population, per capita income and business fluctuations, but 
most were unimportant in explaining number of trade associations.  To account for 
potential endogeneity, they used predicted values from regressions on exogenous 
variables rather than actual observations for imports, exports, government size and 
subsidies.
50
   
Bischoff tested the theory of institutional sclerosis by showing that countries which 
have been economically stable for long periods of time tend to accumulate more interest 
groups.  He used a similar empirical approach to that of Murrell with country-level data 
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for 21 OECD countries.  He showed that political stability does not have a significant 
impact on the number of interest groups within a country, despite Olson’s theory that 
political stability is the main element to cause initial increases in groups.
51
  Bischoff’s 
empirical analysis also used the number of trade associations, excluding Chambers of 
Commerce, as the measure of interest groups within a country.
52
   
The explanatory variables included are population, GNP, imports as a share of GDP, 
share of government expenditures of GDP, share of urban population and political 
stability.  Population and GDP had significant and positive coefficients.  All other 
variables were not important factors in explaining trade associations across OECD 
countries.  When using trade associations per one million inhabitants as the dependent 
variable, coefficients on imports as a share of GDP became significantly positive and 
coefficients on government expenditures became significantly negative.
53
  
Coates, Heckleman and Wilson looked at interest group formation across 140 
countries, both OECD and non-OECD.  In keeping with previous studies, they also used 
trade associations in each country to measure number of interest groups.  One important 
aspect of this study that distinguishes it from other studies is the number of observations.  
They used 5 years worth of data for 140 countries, which implies that they may have 
more precise estimates than others using fewer observations.
 54
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The authors used several measures of stability, development, political system, nation 
size, government size and diversity to explain differences in numbers of trade 
organizations across these countries.  The authors suggested that income, government 
spending and import share are all potentially endogenous regressors for number of trade 
associations.  To correct for this, they used a log-log specification with lagged values as 
instruments.  Their findings implied that a nation’s stability, political system, size, 
diversity and socioeconomic development are the key explanatory variables for interest 
group formation.  Each explained group formation as predicted by theory.  A more stable 
and developed nation under a democratic system will foster the growth of trade 




Benson and Engen defined the number of interest groups that form in a particular 
political market as a function of the quantity of output from the legislative process.    
They also defined the quantity of legislative output demanded as a function of the price 
of that output, the income of the demanders and the opportunity costs of buying 
government favor.  This study used the number of registered lobbyists in 1975 as a cross-
sectional measure for interest groups in U.S. states.  They defined the number of 
lobbyists as a function of population size and growth, income, age of population, 
education and legislative bills passed in the previous year.  The authors also define the 
number of legislative bills passed as a function of the number of lobbyists, the size of the 
legislature, the length of the legislative session, how often the legislature meets, the 
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senate-to-house ratio, the proportion of the legislature that is of the majority party, the 
number of committees per legislator and the average number of assignments per 
committee.
 56
    
Their results indicated that the number of lobbyists has a positive relationship with 
population size and growth, per capita income, age of population, education and a 
negative relationship with the previous number of bills passed by the legislature.  They 
also found that the number of bills passed has a positive relationship with the size of the 
legislature, length of the session, the number of lobbyists, the percentage of majority 
party members, the senate-to-house ratio and the number of committees, and a negative 




McChesney argued that interest groups compete for consumer surplus rents on both 
the production and consumption sides of the market.  The most common basis used to 
explain why consumers organize less frequently than producers is that they have higher 
costs of organization related to free-riding; however, McChesney noted many other 
reasons to explain why trade associations are more widespread than consumer oriented 
organizations.  Trade associations provide additional industry benefits beyond those of 
obtaining transfers from the government.  Organizing allows the exchange of information 
and the development of industry standards that lower production costs and increase 
industry demand.  Consumers also have smaller individual shares of rents, making it 
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easier for their own surplus to be extracted and given to others.  And, organization 
attracts attention from politicians increasing the likelihood of surplus extraction; 
therefore, consumer groups are more likely to experience a negative outcome of 
organization than producer groups that have higher individual rent shares.
58
 This study 
provides support for using trade associations to measure interest groups across states as 
they make up the majority of organized interests. 
McChesney also discussed an interesting reason for group formation, yet one that 
seems impossible to distinguish in the data.  He explained “milker bills,” which are a 
means of extortion for legislators to obtain favor from special interest groups.  This type 
of legislation threatens to extract rents or increase the costs of production for an industry, 
which provokes a response in the form of campaign contributions from groups to prevent 
its passage.  In essence, legislators can “milk” money out of groups by threatening to pass 
rent-extracting legislation.
59
  More of this type of activity will surely result in more 
interest groups/interest group activity, but measuring this narrowly legal activity would 
prove difficult.  
 
III. Data Description 
 
Two approaches to measuring interest group activity were taken in this study to 
explain the differences in interest groups across U.S. states.  Both used state-level panel 
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data for all 50 states over the years 1990-2005.
60
  As with previous studies, the dependent 
variable was measured by using the number of trade associations in each state excluding 
Chambers of Commerce.  The second approach used trade associations per capita in 
following Bischoff’s use of trade associations per one million inhabitants.
61
  Both 
approaches will allow my results to be comparable to previous studies done with country-
level data.  All data on trade associations were collected from the IRS exempt 
organization data files.
62
  Summary statistics for all variables are available in Table 3.1 of 
Appendix B. 
 
Description of Dependent Variables 
Number of Trade Associations and Trade Associations per Capita:  In keeping with 
previous studies, the number of trade associations excluding Chambers of Commerce was 
used to measure the number of interest groups per state.  While data was available on all 
tax-exempt organizations, trade associations have a greater incentive to push narrow 
agendas through lobbying.  Labor unions would be a welcome addition to this measure of 
interest groups; however, they are not tax-exempt and were therefore not included in the 
reported data.   
                                                 
60
 There are some exceptions for Nebraska which has a unicameral legislature. 
61
 I. Bischoff, “Determinants of the Increase in the Number of Interest Groups in Western Democracies: 
Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from 21 OECD Countries,” 197-218. 
62
 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service Online, “SOI Tax Stats-Exempt 
Organizations:  IRS Master File Data,” 9 June 2007, 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/charitablestats/article/0,,id=97186,00.html (accessed August 22, 2007). 
 45
The literature appeals to the definition of two interest group categories as set forth by 
Salisbury.
 63
  Interest groups may be either “sectional” in that they undertake economic 
activities specific to the group, or they may be “promotional” in that they promote 
specific ideas common to the group.  So, in the spirit of Murrell I have included only 
sectional interest groups, which he defines as, “non-governmental formal organizations 
whose members share sectional interests the attainment of which requires the production 
of goods which have, to some extent, the properties of public goods.”
64
  While some 
measure of the political influence of each interest group would be more ideal, no measure 
is currently available.  Because population has proven to be a large determinant of trade 
associations I have also used trade associations per capita as a second measure of interest 
groups. 
 
Description of Explanatory Variables 
Some of the explanatory variables used in cross-country studies should also be 
important in explaining interest groups across U.S. states.  Other cross-country 
explanatory variables may be too similar across U.S. states to have any discernable effect.  
The following is a description of the explanatory variables used in my analysis and the 
expected signs on their coefficients.   
Population:  I included population as an explanatory variable for number of trade 
associations as it has been an important determinant for cross-country studies.  Murrell 
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notes that population may have opposing effects on the number of groups.  In other 
words, as population increases, there should be more groups; but, as population increases, 
the heterogeneity of the population will also increase, thus decreasing the number of 
“common goals” within a group and decreasing the benefits of joining a group to any one 
member.  Yet, population was positively related to number of groups in all 
aforementioned cross-country empirical studies.  Because it is also expected that the cost 
of regulation per person decreases with population I expect the sign on population to be 
positive in this analysis as well. 
Per Capita Income:  As discussed above, measures of socioeconomic development 
were found to be important in determining interest group activity in many studies.  But, 
as noted by Coates, Heckleman and Wilson, income may be endogenous to number of 
groups.
65
  To account for this, I also used lagged values of per capita income to 
instrument current per capita income.
66
  Included in my results are both OLS and IV 
estimates of the per capita income effect on trade associations.  Data on per capita income 
was collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
67
 The sign on this has traditionally 
been found to be positive, but should be left to the data as there are opposing substitution 
and income effects.  Because the opportunity cost of time increases with income, it will 
be more costly to spend time lobbying; however, high income states have more money to 
spend on forming groups and pushing agendas. 
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Number of Committees in the Senate:  Crain and Tollison explain differences in the 
sizes of majorities in state legislatures using independent variables such as the number 
and size of legislative committees.  They find that both have a positive impact on the size 
of legislative majorities and that this relationship holds because majorities attempt to 
organize the legislature and committee systems to their advantage.
 68
   
What is important about those results for this study is that the authors explained how 
committees will hold hearings and conduct investigations in order to see what demanders 
of legislation (i.e. interest groups) want.  More committees will be able to monitor more 
special interests, and therefore more committees should result in more interest groups.
69
   
This topic was also explored by Kroszner and Stratmann for the financial services 
sector.  They found that committees offer avenues for repeated business between interest 
groups and legislators.  Committees provide an enforcement mechanism for “fee-for-
service” agreements between legislators and interest groups since these contracts cannot 
legally be written and enforced.   The authors also offered that the use of committees in 
this way implies that term-limits, which create greater legislative turnover, destabilize 
committee reputation.
70
  Because the house and senate are the only two possibilities for 
committee residence, I have included the number of committees in the senate and used 
the house committees as the omitted variable.   
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Senate Majority Sizes:  Also following Crain and Tollison, a larger number of 
members in a legislative majority party will increase the costs to groups of obtaining a 
majority vote.  Therefore, included as explanatory variables for trade associations were 
the number of members in the majority party for the house.
71
  Again, both senate and 
house majority sizes are highly correlated, so house majorities were omitted.  I expect the 
sign on the senate majority size coefficient to be negative. 
Another effect this variable may pick up is one discussed by Levmore.  He explained 
that political instability may be a breeding ground for interest group activity because it is 
easier to push agendas where there is no majority to overpower. If there is a clear 
majority opinion against an interest group’s agenda and this opinion is obviously revealed 
in recurring elections, then the interest group is less likely to form in this stable political 




Majority Party:  To examine whether one party’s control in either chamber of the 
legislature is associated with more or less groups, I have included a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the Republicans have the majority party and 0 otherwise.  This dummy 
variable was included only for the Senate. 
Length of State Constitution:  Anderson, et al. specified a model of constitutional 
change using the interest group theory of government.  They showed that the one 
government instrument thought to be above the reach of interest group activity, the 
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constitution, is actually a vehicle for it.  Those interest groups who are able to secure a 
constitutional amendment in their favor may expend more resources than for a legislative 
bill because the legislative route lacks the durability of a constitutional amendment.
 
They 
measured durable wealth transfers to interest groups by the length of state constitutions 
and they showed that independent judiciaries help to impart this durability onto 
constitutional amendments.  They also noted that former members of the Confederacy 
have tended to completely scrap their constitution and rewrite it, which leaves room for 
interest groups to vie for favors. 
73
   
I have included the length of state constitutions, in words, to account for the 
possibility of durable wealth transfers within a state.  The sign on this coefficient is hard 
to pin down because it may be that trade associations who have managed to secure a 
durable constitutional wealth transfer have market power over state funds, leaving little 
room for additional interests to secure any kind of wealth transfer.  But, if the state 
constitution is long, associations may see this as a signal that durable transfers are more 
easily available than in states with shorter constitutions. 
House-to-Senate Ratio:  According to the study done by Anderson, Tollison and 
Shughart, the house-to-senate ratio reflects the degree of bicameralism in state 
legislatures.  As the number of representatives in the house rises in relation to the number 
of senators, the optimal majority in either chamber is expected to be larger.  So, this 
increases the cost of obtaining a majority vote in either chamber and states with larger 
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house-to-senate ratios (H/S) should have fewer interest groups; therefore, I expect the 
sign on the H/S ratio to be negative.
 74
    
State Transfer Payments in Dollars:  All previous studies used some measure of 
government size to explain trade associations across countries.  The amount of state 
government transfer payments should account not only for government size, but also the 
degree of incentive for additional interest groups to form provided through government 
handouts to others.  Theory suggests that the more government handouts the larger the 
number of begging hands.  Bischoff finds that government expenditures are negatively 
related, contradictory to theory, but only had access to 18 observations of government 
expenditures.
75
  Coates, Heckleman and Wilson have suggested that government 
spending is endogenous to the number of trade associations, and they used lagged values 




Laband and Sophocleus estimated the amount of resource expenditures on non-
exchange, non-charity transfer payments.  They used data on expenditures spent on 
acquiring or preventing transfers, and their numbers suggest that over a trillion dollars 
was spent in the U.S. in 1985 on this kind of activity.   They conclude that transfers, 
whether acquired through private investment or social accord, are costly and a great deal 
of economic activity is concerned with the acquisition of transfers rather than the creation 
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  Assuming that interest groups are the main seekers of these transfers, this 
type of spending should more precisely measure the spending done specifically on 
interest group appeasement.   
To address the potential endogeneity of transfer payments, I have included an OLS as 
well as an IV approach to measuring the effect of government spending on transfer 
payments on the number of trade associations.  I have mimicked the Coates, Heckleman 
and Wilson approach by using lagged values of transfer payments to instrument current 
values of government spending.
78
 
Size of Legislature:  As Stigler observes, geographical legislative size tends to be 
independent of the size of the area.
 79
   He notes several reasons this might be the case, 
one being that, “an area represents substantial and well-defined interest groups.”
80
  
Therefore, I have included the size of each state legislature with the expectation that a 
larger legislature is associated with more interest groups.  However, the direction of 
causation is questionable since more well-defined interests may result in more 
representatives of those interests.  Data on committees, majority sizes and parties, house-
to-senate ratio, government spending, length of state constitutions and sizes of state 
legislatures were collected from the Book of States.
81
   
Heterogeneity of Industry:  McCormick and Tollison explained that homogeneity 
among interests within a population will result in fewer transfers than populations with 
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heterogeneous interests.  Separate interests generate distinct groups, some more 
organized than others, which will in turn seek to obtain transfers in their favor.
82
  Benson 
and Engen also note that the heterogeneity of a population should be considered when 
explaining interest groups across U.S. states.
83
  
When Kennelly and Murrell look at how trade associations form across industries, 
they include measures of the demand for trade associations, such as the four-firm 
concentration ratio.  That ratio captures a measure of firms within the industry and the 
authors show that more firms result in more trade associations in an industry.
84
  For 
similar reasoning, I have investigated two measures of the heterogeneity of industry 
within each state.   
These measures were calculated in the following ways:  The first measure is a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated by using the shares of numbers of firms 
within an industry relative to total firms in all industries.  Since sheer numbers of firms 
within an industry says nothing about the relative size of firms, I also calculated the HHI 
using the annual payroll for each industry relative to the annual payroll for all industries.  
Because there are discrepancies when only looking at the top four industries, I have used 
the HHI rather than a four-firm concentration ratio.  See Figure 3.1 in Appendix B for a 
detailed description of the calculation method used for these measures.   
These Herfindahl indexes should provide information regarding the relative 
concentration of industries in a given state.  For example, Virginia has a particularly large 
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tobacco/agricultural industry and Indiana has a particularly large manufacturing industry.  
Therefore, the HHI for each of these states should be relatively high since total industry 
within each state is very concentrated in one particular area.  A relatively low HHI would 
be indicative of a state with more dispersed types of industry, such as Delaware and 
Georgia.
 85
   
I expect that a more dispersed industry would lead to more total trade associations, 
whereas states with high levels of industry concentration would lead to more associations 
within the dominant industry.  Consequently, it is likely that there are opposing effects on 
the sign of the HHI coefficient.  For example, a large manufacturing industry will lead to 
more manufacturing trade associations, but when industry is dispersed among many types 
there are likely to be more overall trade associations.  It is up to the data to determine 
which effects are larger.  Unfortunately, this data was only available through the Census 
Bureau for the years 1998-2005, so I have included regressions with and without these 
measures in the interest of utilizing all observations.
86
   
 
IV. Empirical Approach and Results 
 
For each model, a log-log form was used so that coefficients may be interpreted as 
elasticities.  As mentioned above, there is a potential endogeneity problem with transfer 
spending and per capita income in association with trade organizations.  To account for 
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this, I have included both an OLS approach and an IV approach.  The IV approach uses 
lagged values of transfers to instrument transfer payments, and lagged values of per 
capita income are used to instrument per capita income.
87
  Regression results are 
provided in Tables 3.2-3.9 of Appendix B.  
  
Using Number of Trade Associations as the Dependent Variable 
Tables 3.2-3.5 provide both OLS and IV results using the natural log of the number of 
trade associations as the dependent variable.  When using the number of trade 
associations as the dependent variable, population seems to have a significant impact on 
the number of associations.  The coefficient is positive in all but one instrumental 
variables model, which follows the results in other studies using country-level data.  And, 
this implies that more associations form as population increases and that the cost of 
regulation per person decreases as population increases.   
The coefficient on per capita income is positive and significant for the models 
excluding fixed effects, but negative and significant in the fixed effects models. A 
possible explanation for this discrepancy is that there may be two opposing effects on the 
per capita income coefficient.  First, previous studies have found this coefficient to be 
positive, indicating that more interest groups form with more socio-economic 
development.  Second, the coefficient may also be picking up the decline in economic 
development due to a dissipation of productive resources by interest groups.  This 
possibility is explored in a study provided in the next chapter.       
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The coefficient on numbers of senate committees varies in sign based on whether 
fixed effects are accounted for in the model.  With fixed effects unaccounted for, the sign 
is unexpectedly negative and significant; yet, when accounting for fixed effects the sign 
varies and is insignificant.  There may also be opposing effects at work here.  More 
committees serve more interests, while more committees may make the legislature too 
balkanized and therefore too difficult for new interests groups to gain a significant 
foothold in a vast array of committees.  The increased number of committees may serve a 
wider array of interests from only a few incumbent interest groups, rather than serving 
the interests of additional groups.  Also, the more committees from whom you must 
obtain favor, the higher the cost of obtaining legislation for a given interest group.   
Senate majority sizes follow the a priori expectations in that the coefficient is 
significant and negatively related to number of trade associations.  Since larger majority 
sizes imply higher costs of obtaining legislation, there are likely to be fewer interests in 
states with larger majority sizes.  The dummy variable used to measure Republican senate 
majorities does not seem to provide a definitive answer regarding the differences in the 
two main political parties.  The coefficient is positive when significant, yet I would 
expect that each party has their own interests more so than one party having more 
interests than the other, which may explain the variation in sign on this dummy variable. 
The length of state constitutions also seems to be negatively related to the number of 
trade associations.  This suggests that maybe a few interest groups were originally able to 
corner the market in securing constitutional transfers and keep others from doing so.  
Additionally, it may be that the average price for a transfer is higher in those states with 
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more constitutional handouts.  If these durable transfers have occurred more often, it may 
be that the dollar price per length of durability is higher for a legislative bill than for a 
constitutional amendment.  If so, groups may choose to form in states with a lower dollar 
price per length of durability for legislative bills. 
The negative coefficient on the house-to-senate ratio measure implies that the theory 
discussed in the literature holds.  Higher house-to-senate ratios mean a higher price for 
legislation and thus fewer interest groups.  The coefficient on state transfer payments 
follows the intuition that bigger government handouts will lead to more begging hands.  
The coefficient is positive and significant in nearly all cases.    
The size of legislatures appears to be an important factor in how many trade 
associations form within a state.  The coefficient is almost always significant and is 
always positively related to the number of trade associations in each of the models.  
While the sign on this coefficient was expected to be negative given that larger 
legislatures would seem more costly to win over in the passage of a legislative bill, it is 
actually positively related to the number of trade boards.  This result may be explained by 
the likely increase in the number of groups that have access to a legislator when there are 
more legislators available.  Greater access to a legislator may signal greater ease with 
which opinions are heard during sessions. 
In obtaining these results I used both the Herfindahl index calculated with the number 
of firms and the index calculated with the payroll of firms.  The results did not change 
significantly whether using one measure or the other; therefore, I have only included 
results using the Herfindahl index calculated with payroll data so as to account for the 
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relative differences in firm size across state industries.  Given the coefficient obtained on 
the HHI measure, it seems that the more concentrated a state’s industry, the fewer trade 
associations the state will have.  This seems intuitively correct as highly concentrated 
industries will have more homogenous ideologies concerning wealth transfers.  In 
addition, highly powerful and concentrated industries might corner the market on trade 
associations giving smaller, less powerful groups a narrow margin for obtaining favorable 
legislation.   
 
Using Trade Associations Per Capita as the Dependent Variable 
Tables 3.6-3.9 provide both OLS and IV results using the natural log of trade 
associations per capita as the dependent variable.  When using trade associations per 
capita as the dependent variable the results remain similar to those found using the 
number of trade associations to measure interest groups.  The per capita income 
coefficient remains positively related to trade associations when fixed effects are not 
accounted for and negatively related in the fixed effects models.  The numbers of senate 
committees still have negative relationship with trade associations per capita without 
accounting for fixed effects; so, it seems that any relationship between committees and 
groups is dominated by the balkanization of legislature rather than the effect many 
committees could provide by serving a variety of interests.  
Majority size continues to have a negative impact on trade associations and 
Republican senate majority continues to vary in its impact.  Length of state constitutions 
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and the homogeneity of industry have coefficients that remain negative, whereas the 




Although more data would be highly useful in pinning down the settings that foster 
interest group development, this chapter has provided some evidence that population 
differences, socioeconomic development, differences in the structure of legislature, 
government and industry, and public funds spending are important factors in determining 
interest group formation.  Even though U.S. states are more similar in certain aspects than 
a panel of countries, it is still important to know what factors contribute to increased 
groups that actively rent seek.  It is especially important to be able to articulate these 
factors in countries with high levels of socioeconomic development, as interest groups 
use up the real resources that would continue to help developed countries excel.  
Research in this area will aid in untangling private and political interests and their 
effect on state economic development.  If the theory of institutional sclerosis is correct, 
then pointing out factors that contribute to this sclerosis is important for understanding 
how to prevent or diminish it.  This is certainly not a comprehensive investigation of 
those factors; it is merely an attempt to further understand the impact of interest groups 
within a single country.  For future work on this topic I plan to break up the industry 
measures into a measure specifically for agricultural firms and a measure for the 
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heterogeneity of all other industries as agricultural industries tend to have significant 
impacts with lobbying efforts.   
Future work on this topic should explore alternative measures of interest group 
activity.  One alternative measure should account for the relative sizes of groups, such as 
the number of members or the financial backing behind a group.  Data are currently being 
collected on the assets of groups with the intention of providing a group-level data study 

















Differences in economic development across U.S. states have been attributed to 
many factors such as differences in the accumulation of both human and physical capital; 
however, the question this chapter attempts to answer is what impact do interest groups 
have in this area.  Olson first posed this question in his book, The Rise and Decline of 
Nations.
88
  Since then, many authors have addressed rent seeking under the interest group 
theory of government and the relationship those groups have with politicians and 
regulation.  In the decades of research on this topic, the literature has come closer to 
unraveling the mysteries of interest groups and government.  Yet, less contribution has 
been made to find out if interest groups dissipate real resources to the degree that 
economic development and growth are affected.  My research is meant to supplement 
Olson’s original work and the existing literature on pressure groups in the public choice 
area. 
The interest group theory of government is best described by Crain and Tollison 
as a situation in which, “… legislation is sold to groups who bid for the protective shelter 
of the state.”
89
 But, what types of transfers might an interest group try to gain from the 
government?  Stigler outlines the four types of state aid that interest groups might try to 
acquire:  1) direct cash subsidies, 2) control over new entrants, 3) influence over 
substitute and complement markets, and 4) price fixing. He notes that direct cash 
subsidies have been obtained in the past by airlines, colleges and universities, and war 
veterans.  He does suggest that the acquisition of direct cash subsidies are likely not the 
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most preferred government favor because the money will have to be spread out over more 
group members if group member entry is not controlled.
90
 
Tullock discussed the US automotive industry’s attempt to control new entrants 
by obtaining import restrictions on Japanese vehicles. He notes that the automotive 
industry received great pressure from the United Auto Workers and rather than build 
lower cost production facilities to better compete with foreign competition, the auto 
industry first went to Washington to try and obtain special import restrictions.  While 
they eventually did take measures to lower production costs for American made cars, 
import quotas on Japanese vehicles were also put in place by legislators as a means of 
retaining the votes of the automotive industry in times of re-election.
91
   
Marvel showed that groups may form within an industry to gain regulation that 
weakens the high cost firms in such a way that limits competition.  As an example of 
influence over substitute goods, he explained that steam-mill firms lobbied for the British 
Factory Acts of the 1830s in order to raise the production costs of water-mill firms.  The 
pretense for this legislation was that it was immoral to allow women and children to work 
long hours and that their working hours should be limited; however, the effect of this 
legislation was that it also limited the output from water-mill firms because they worked 
longer hours when water flow was fast and shorter hours when it was slow.  This did not 
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have the same effect on steam-mill owners because their working hours did not depend 
on water flow, but it did limit the amount of competition steam-mill owners faced.
92
 
Posner pointed out many examples of industries that lobbied to be regulated in the 
interest of price fixing.  In the interest of maintaining the railroad cartel, railroad firms 
supported the Interstate Commerce Act that prevented them from practicing price 
discrimination.  AT&T, truckers and airlines all supported regulation that prevented 
competition from becoming “excessive” within their industries.  Formally disguised as 
pro-consumer laws, they would unlikely be supported by the regulated firms unless there 
was something to gain from regulation.  As most consumers find organization more 
costly than firms within the same industry, real resources were allocated by these firms 
toward procuring regulatory legislation that would aid in maintaining high prices and 
hampering competition.  In addition, Posner notes that contrary to the thoughts of many 
on the extreme left, big business interests are hardly the only ones served in government.  
Interests from labor unions, agricultural firms and many blue collar industries are also 
served by those in Congress.
93
 
Interest groups expend real resources to get special favors from the government, 
which are many times artificially created rents such as state-granted monopoly rights.  
Regardless of the rent that is captured, real resources are spent on unproductive means 
rather than being put back into the economy to continue to generate additional real 
resources.  These resources could be invested into additional capital accumulation, but 
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are instead invested to obtain transfers that favor some and harm others.  Intuitively, it 
seems that the dissipation of these real resources should negatively impact the ability of 
an economy to generate real output thus slowing standard of living growth.  This chapter 
provides additional state level evidence of this intuition regarding economic development 
in the U.S.   
Existing literature points out a few proxies for interest group activity.  I have 
included some existing proxies found in the last chapter, as well as a newly created state 
index for lobbying activity.  Four measures of economic development were used and I 
found that interest groups do in fact have an overall negative impact on these measures of 
well-being for U.S. states over the years 1990-2005.  The following section provides the 
theoretical motivation for the analysis.  The third section includes a literature review of 
both empirical growth models and of the interest group theory of government, as well as 
a discussion of previously used measures of interest group activity.  The fourth section 
includes a discussion of the data and the empirical specification used, and the last two 
sections discuss OLS regression results and conclusions. 
 
II. Theoretical Motivation 
 
This section presents a brief explanatory model of the relationship between 
interest groups, the grantors of special interest legislation, and growth of real per capita 
GDP.  Interest groups, the demanders of special interest legislation, have two routes they 
may take in order to get special favors from state governments:  they can lobby for a bill 
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passed through the legislature or they can lobby for a constitutional amendment in order 
to obtain special privileges and/or government transfers.  
Below a utility function is specified including things that may be important to the 
group.  The utility of a special interest group depends on the dollar amount in transfers 
they are able to obtain (Tit) and the durability of these transfers (Dit).  Transfers are a 
function of the number of bills or amendments that are passed in their favor granting 
special privilege, such as import quotas and protective tariffs, (BAit). An interest group i 
at time t will maximize its expected discounted present utility, Uit.   The budget constraint 
on this utility function includes the costs of lobbying for legislation and constitutional 
amendments as well as the costs of maintaining the group’s solidarity. 
 




(2)                                              Tit = f (BAit) 
The durability of constitutional amendments at time t depends heavily on judicial 
independence as found by Landes and Posner.  That is, they found that the more 
independent the judiciary the more durable a constitutional amendment as judges tend to 
interpret and apply amendments with the intent of the original enacting legislation.  
Original intent is usually favorable to the interest group that helped form the amendment, 
which means independent judiciaries help propagate this original intent and impart 
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durability on the rents obtained through constitutional amendments.  Factors like lifetime 
appointments, rather than elections for limited terms, and guaranteed salaries affect the 
degree of judicial independence.  Obviously, a special government favor that is more 
durable will be more expensive for the interest group to obtain, and constitutional 
amendments are thought to be more durable than legislative bills
94
. 
In supporting work by Anderson, et al., the question of why judges would behave 
this way is answered.  More durable legislation can be sold at a higher price (in the form 
of campaign contributions, ect.), which benefits legislators.  Because judiciary budgets 
and salaries are determined by legislators, judges have an incentive to remain 
independent and impart durability to legislative bills.  They offer that judges behave in 




Legislators are the suppliers of special interest legislation and they provide the 
route through which an interest group must get a constitutional amendment or legislative 
bill.  A legislator will maximize the present discounted value of his utility function, 
 
(3)                                           Lit = l (Git, Xit) 
 
  The above utility function was originally defined by Coates and Munger such 
that a legislator’s utility depends on a vector of consumption goods (Git), which may 
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include things like prestige, political influence and the feeling of performing a public 
service.  It also depends on a vector (Xit), which defines his tastes and preferences for 
certain legislation.  The legislator faces constraints such as constituency interests and 
preferences, party and institutional pressures and electoral security.
 96
   
Interest groups can play a large role in the re-election and party campaign 
contributions for legislators, and are therefore a major part of their utility maximization 
problem. Given the constraint that legislators want to remain in office, they must take 
into account the special interests of voting groups.  In supplying this legislation to interest 
groups, legislators will also face some costs associated with procuring tax money from 
other less organized groups.   
Becker laid out a cost function for providing subsidies to pressure groups, where 
subsidies are considered to be any political action that raises the income of the group.
97
  
The cost function he defined had the following properties: 
(4)                    G (Rs) ≥  Rs, Gʹ ≥ 1,    and Gʹʹ ≥ 0 
 
Where, G is the cost of providing Rs, the subsidy per group member.  This cost 
per member includes any dead weight costs of distortions on recipient choices due to the 
subsidy, which would make the subsidy cost to each member greater than the actual 
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Tollison explained that groups who bid for the protective shelter of the state are 
those who have low costs of organization and they receive transfers taken from those 
with high costs of organization.  In other words, the demanders of legislation will be 
comprised of groups that can organize for less than one dollar in order to obtain a dollars 
worth of transfers.  And, those groups for whom it would cost more than one dollar to 
organize and avoid the loss of one dollar will make up the suppliers of those transfers.  
Together, unorganized suppliers of transfers and organized demanders of transfers will 
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form a market for legislation, as shown by Figure 4.1 on the previous page.  Legislators, 
as Tollison discussed, will monitor this supply and demand process by becoming a 
middle man between suppliers and demanders.  He notes that because legislators and 
unorganized groups both make up the supply curve for legislation, the costs of organizing 
will be reflected in the slope of the supply curve, while the position of the curve will 
depend on how efficient legislators are at providing transfers to interest groups.
 99
 
Barro’s neoclassical model of country growth is specified as, 
 
Dy = f (y, y*) 
 
Where, Dy is the growth rate of per capita output, y is the current level of per capita 
output, and y* is the long-run or steady–state level of per capita output.  The convergence 
hypothesis states, in part, that the lower the starting level of per capita output, y, the 
higher the growth rate of per capita output, Dy.  The steady-state level, y*, depends on 
private sector choice variables including savings rates, labor supply, fertility rates and 
educational attainment, and on government choice variables such as tax rates, the extent 
of market distortions, and spending.
 100
   
Olson’s theories implied that countries which have seen large growth rates after being 
defeated in war can attribute their growth convergence in part to the detachment of 
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interest group power.  In other words, countries experience a break down in political 
structure and therefore interest group influence.
101
   
The market for interest group legislation plays a major role in the expenditures of 
government as well as the creation of market distortions, such as import quotas and 
tariffs.  In other words, the amount of legislation is decided by legislators, unorganized 
tax payers and interest groups, given current political institutions and policies, and then 
that legislation determines to a large degree the amount of government spending and 
market distortions.  This theoretical connection between interest groups, government and 
development is the motivation for testing empirically the extent to which interest groups 
affect the economic development of U.S. states.   
 
III. Review of Literature 
 
Growth Determinants Literature 
Barro did a panel study across 114 countries using data from 1965-1990.  The 
major determinants of per capita growth rates for these countries according to this study 
are current level of GDP, education, government consumption, fertility rates, democracy 
and trade variables, and the inflation rate.  Many of these variables should also be 
important for explaining differences in development across states, although the 
similarities among states should allow the omission of variables such as inflation, 
democracy measures and trade variables.  However, there are certainly differences in 
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education and government consumption levels, therefore these should help explain 
differences in the variation in development.  As economic theory suggests, Barro found 
that more human capital affects growth positively, and more government consumption 
affects growth negatively.
102
   
Charles Jones looked at the effect of ideas and research and development (R&D) 
on the growth of the U.S. as a whole.  Some important variables included in his analysis 
were human capital, the labor force, the capital-labor ratio and annual change in years of 
schooling along with proxies for his R&D variables of interest.  Those R&D variables 
included number of researchers, multifactor productivity and the share of labor in R&D 
as well as the change in the share of labor in R&D.  The first three variables are included 
in most growth models and Jones found the coefficients to be positive and significant.  
Although his estimates were for the entire U.S. across time, the growth rate of the U.S. is 
compromised of the growth rates of individual states.  Therefore, these components 
should also be important to individual state growth and development.
103
   
Frank Hanna looked at state per capita income components from 1919-1951.  He 
argued that U.S. state per capita income is determined by per capita wages and salaries, 
per capita proprietors’ incomes, property incomes, and government transfer payments.  
He finds no relationship between per capita proprietors’ incomes and per capita income, 
but attributes the lack of relationship to the time period of interest as most proprietors 
from 1919-1951 were farmers with little income.  He found a significantly positive 
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relationship between state per capita incomes and the other estimated coefficients.  He 
explained the positive relationship between transfer payments and per capita income by 
the fact that transfer payments, such as unemployment and social security payments, are 
typically based on previous salaries.  So, states with higher per capita incomes generally 
give out higher transfer payments.
104
 
Mitchener and McLean follow the work of Easterlin
105
, but rather than looking at 
crude state per capita incomes, they adjusted for differences in standards of living across 
states.  They determined price-adjusted per capita incomes by dividing each by the 
consumer price index.  Among other typically used independent variables, they find 
positive relationships between price-adjusted per capita income and both the labor force 
participation rate and estimated labor productivity.
106
  
Edward Denison noted that it is important to figure out how to get economic 
growth closer to its potential before we can truly reap the full benefits of eliminating 
policies that protect certain groups at the expense of total output.  He explained U.S. 
economic growth from 1929-1957 by increased education, labor force, capital and 
knowledge.  His work suggested many ways in which this stable, democratic society can 
increase the efficiency with which its economy works.  Some suggestions included 
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removing barriers to international trade, obstacles imposed by labor unions and wasteful 
tax spending on “little-wanted” farm products.
107
  
Dougherty and Jorgenson departed from traditional growth accounting fashioned 




, and determined quality-constant 
measures of capital and labor inputs.  The work done by Dougherty and Jorgenson 
revealed that these are highly important sources of growth for industrialized countries.  
These quality-constant measures account not only for substitution between capital and 





Interest Group Theory of Government Literature 
Olson first laid out the implication that special interest groups reduce the 
efficiency and aggregate income of a society, while at the same time making political 
structure more factious.  He argued that interest groups merely redistribute income rather 
than create it, which reduces social efficiency and output.  This reduced output would 
stem from the society holding on to old technologies and being less responsive to 
changing conditions, which slows economic growth.  He provided evidence of these 
implications for U.S. states by showing that membership in special interest organizations 
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was negatively related to the growth of states from World War II through the 1970s.  He 
provided similar evidence for Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain.
111
 
Nardinelli, Wallace and Warner used the length of time of political stability for 
each U.S. state as a proxy for the number of interest groups.  The political age of a state is 
defined as the number of years since the last major political upheaval.  When using this 
proxy for interest groups the authors find that interest groups do not have a negative 
impact on the income measure for U.S. states.  They conclude that differences in income 




If legislation imparts some transfer from less organized groups to more organized 
groups, as theorized by McCormick and Tollison, there will be a cost to obtaining this 
legislation.  They showed that this cost entails gaining the favor of the majority in both 
the house and the senate; therefore, more legislation will be passed where the cost of 
obtaining it is lower.  Given that there are diminishing returns to obtaining votes within 
each house, they argue that it is easier to obtain votes if the house and senate are more 
evenly divided in their numbers of seats.  They find that the more total seats within the 
legislature and the larger the ratio of house seats to senate seats, the more bills and 
occupational regulation enacted across states.
113
  
Anderson, et al. specified a model of constitutional change using the interest 
group theory of government.  They showed that the one government instrument thought 
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to be above the reach of interest group activity, the state constitution, is actually a vehicle 
for it.  Those interest groups who are able to secure a constitutional amendment in their 
favor may expend more resources than for a legislative bill, but the legislative route lacks 
the durability of a constitutional amendment.  Durable wealth transfers by interest groups 
are measured by the length of state constitutions in words.  They provided evidence to 
show that independent judiciaries do indeed help to impart durability onto constitutional 
amendments.  They also noted that former members of the Confederacy have tended to 
completely scrap their constitution and rewrite it, which leaves room for interest groups 
to capture durable constitutional wealth transfers.
 114
  
Persson and Tabellini noted that constitutional change and design entails a 
tradeoff between accountability and representation.  The easier it is to replace incumbent 
government and make them more accountable, the more likely it is that interest groups 
will be represented rather than the actual representative population.  They state that 
“…this greater accountability also raises the propensity to target benefits to narrow 
constituencies at the expense of broad spending programs.”
 115
   
In their cross-country study, they find constitutions that use the plurality rule as 
opposed to proportional representation actually enforce more accountability and result in 
smaller rent consumption from interest groups, as well as less political corruption.
 116
  
                                                 
114
 Gary M. Anderson, Delores T. Martin, William F. Shughart and Robert D. Tollison, “Behind the Veil: 
The Political Economy of Constitutional Change,” in Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Public 
Choice, ed. W. Mark Crain and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990) 89-
100. 
115
 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, “Constitutions and Economic Policy,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004):   77. 
116
 Under the plurality rule, only the winner(s) of the highest vote share(s) get represented in a given 
district.  Proportional representation awards seats in proportion to votes in each district. 
 75
Therefore, the structure of a constitution can actually promote more constitutional level 
interest group activity and should also be an important factor in whether more rents are 
disposed into the interest group “black hole.”  While they use the structure of 
constitutions as the dependent variable in this analysis, their results are important to this 
study in that they show evidence that constitutions are indeed a route for special 
interests.
117
   
Becker’s theoretical model of competition among interest groups addressed 
Posner’s concerns of the public good characteristics in obtaining favorable legislation for 
a special interest group with many members.
118
  Becker’s first corollary showed that it is 
not the absolute efficiency in preventing free-riding among members, but the relative 
efficiency of prevention to other industries.  But, he also argued that pressure groups are 
likely to be smaller than the groups that supply the taxes for their subsidies.
119
  So, there 
are obviously free-riding problems with large groups which increase the costs of 
organizing; however, these unorganized groups will provide subsidies for smaller, more 
organized groups who are effective at controlling member free riding. 
 
IV. Empirical Specification and Description of Data 
 
Based on previous studies and on the theoretical motivation described earlier, I 
have formulated an empirical specification to test if there are effects on state economic 
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development from rent-seeking by interest groups.  I have measured state economic 
development using four different variables:  state per capita income, number of new 
housing units built, the value of those new housing units, and the number of initial public 
offerings (IPOs).  The model I used specified economic development as a function of the 
following: 
 
Economic development = f (pop, incperprop, incperworker, k/l, tax, pctworking, 
bachelors, trans, length, year, ratio, size, lobbyscore) 
 
development = Four measures used: state per capita income, new housing units, 
                           value of new housing units, initial public offerings (IPOs)  
pop  = state population, 
incperprop = income per proprietor,  
incperworker = income per worker, 
k/l   = the state capital-labor ratio, 
pctworking  = percent of the population that is in the workforce,  
bachelors  = persons aged 25 and up with a bachelors degree,  
trans  = dollar amount of state transfer payments, 
length = length in words of the state constitution, 
year  = year of the most recently ratified state constitution; 
ratio = ratio of house seats to senate seats in state legislature, 
size = size of state legislature,  
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lobbyscore  = an index based on the degree of required state lobbying 
disclosure that is higher if more disclosure is required. 
 
Summary statistics are provided in Table 4.1 of Appendix C.  To explore 
alternative measures of economic development, I used four dependent variable measures.  
I first used a general measure of well-being:  per capita income.  But, per capita income 
does not tell us everything about the economic development of a state, so I also used the 
number of IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) per year in each state.  On the control of new 
entrants into industries, Stigler commented that, “…regulatory policy will often be so 
fashioned as to retard the growth of new firms.”
120
  IPO data were obtained from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR filing reports and are currently not 
available prior to 1994.
121
  These data represent the number of firms that have filed S-1 
forms, which is the initial form that must be submitted in order to begin offering public 
stock in a company.  If more companies are going public, then conditions must be 
favorable for economic development.   
In addition to IPOs, the number of permits for new housing units is also used to 
measure the degree of economic development in a state.  If conditions are favorable for 
development in a particular state there will be more migration by workers and businesses 
to that state, necessitating more housing.  These are raw numbers of residential housing 
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To account for the possible differences in value of housing versus just new 
housing units, I have also used the average value of new, privately owned housing units 
per state.  These data were also collected from the U.S. Census Bureau. States with more 
highly valued housing are assumed to be more economically developed than states with 
lower housing values.
123
  I also expect more interest group activity to affect housing 
values negatively if these values accurately represent economic development.  The 
following is a discussion of those explanatory variables used for each measure of 
economic development. 
Similar to the Hanna study, I have controlled for the income earned per proprietor 
and the income earned per worker within each state.
124
  This should also adequately 
capture the effects of differences in per capita income across states when looking at the 
other measures of economic development.  Population is also controlled for when 
explaining housing values, units and IPOs. 
Like the Jones study, the capital-labor ratio is included since access to more 
technology and capital investment should have a positive effect on development.
125
  
Because the actual levels were not available, the capital-labor ratio has been measured for 
this study as the ratio of payments made to capital and payments made to labor.  To proxy 
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human capital, I have included the percent of those 25 years and over that have a 
bachelor’s degree.  Similar to Mitchener and McLean, the percentage of population in the 
workforce is included to account for the labor force participation of each state.
126
  Data 
on the percent of the population in the workforce was not reported for the years 2001-
2002, so I have omitted this variable in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for the sake of lost 
observations. 
Several proxies for interest group activity are used, all of which were important 
factors in determining interest groups across states in the previous chapter.  I chose this 
method, rather than using trade associations to measure interest group activity, because it 
allowed me to measure several routes of activity rather than the sheer existence of 
groups.  Just because groups exist does not mean they are active in rent seeking lobbying 
activity; however, empirical work was done including trade associations as the only 
measure of interest group activity in the specification discussed in Section IV of this 
chapter.  The existence of these associations was negatively related to all measures of 
development when accounting for state and year fixed effects.  The coefficient was 
highly significant when using per capita income as the dependent variable, but 
insignificant for the other measures of development.
127
 
To capture interest group activity at the constitutional level, I have controlled for 
both the length of state constitutions in words and the year of the most recently ratified 
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constitution for each state.  According to the Anderson, et al. study mentioned previously, 
rewriting a state constitution leaves room for special interest groups to lobby for durable 
protection to go in the newly ratified constitution.
128
  States with longer constitutions are 
likely to have catered to more special interests as added provisions will require additional 
legalese within the document.  So, if length is indeed a good proxy for constitutional 
interest group transfers, the coefficient should be negative if this type of rent seeking 
limits economic development. 
 A couple of effects could be picked up when controlling for the date of 
ratification.  First, if interest groups accumulate over time, then more recently written 
state constitutions would be subject to additional demanders of constitutional provisions 
than those state constitutions written in earlier periods. Second, there is a tendency in the 
data that states with more recently ratified constitutions are also generally the same states 
that have ratified more than one constitution over time.  When a state has scrapped and 
re-written a constitution, there is room for both the eradication of out-dated constitutional 
transfers and the opportunity for groups to lobby for transfers to be added to the new 
constitution.  It will be up to the data to reveal the sign on this coefficient. 
To proxy legislative level interest group activity, I have included the dollar 
amount of transfers by state and a state lobby score of the degree to which lobbying 
groups are held accountable by the government. Dollar amount of transfer payments may 
measure interest group activity to some degree since many groups compete for transfers 
from government.  If more groups are competing, it implies that the price of getting those 
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payments will be higher and a higher quantity of transfers will be supplied.  However, if 
the amount of transfers is fixed by state budget, only the price of getting them will 
increase.   
As explained by Hanna states with higher per capita incomes tend to give out 
higher transfer payments since many payments are based on previously earned income.
129
  
Therefore, I expect that transfer payments will be positively related to per capita income, 
but negatively related to other measures of economic development.
130
  The state lobby 
score is an index computed by the Center for Public Integrity.  Since states have 
extremely varied laws regarding lobbyists and interest groups, this index is based on a 
series of 48 questions regarding such things as how a lobbyist is defined and when they 




A high state lobby score implies that the state has strict laws regarding lobbying 
activity, and therefore it is more costly to lobby in those states.  The Center for Public 
Integrity views scores of 70 and higher as relatively satisfactory. Scores of 60 to 69 are 
considered marginal. Scores below 60 are considered failing.  Only one state, 
Washington, scored above an 80.  I expect that this score will be positively related to 
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I have also included the ratio of house seats to senate seats and the sizes of state 
legislatures in the spirit of McCormick and Tollison.  Their research showed that more 
legislation is passed when the costs of obtaining a majority vote are smaller.  They also 
found that less legislation is passed the more evenly divided the seats across the house 
and senate; therefore, we should expect less interest group activity for those states with 
lower house-to-senate ratios.
133
  In addition, the previous chapter found a positive 
relationship between interest group prevalence and the size of state legislatures.  Because 
groups feel they have better access to legislators and may be able to exploit that to their 
advantage, we should also see less development where state legislatures are smaller. 
 State level panel data were used to estimate the above model using each of the 
four dependent variables.  All variables with the exception of bachelors, length, year, 
ratio, size and lobby scores were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
 134
  
The percent of state population with a bachelor’s degree was obtained from the National 
Center for Educational Statistics,
 135
 and data on length, year, ratio and size were 
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obtained from the Book of the States.
136





V. Estimation Results 
 
The OLS regression results using each of the four dependent variables are 
provided in Tables 4.2-4.5 of Appendix C.  Tables 4.2 and 4.3 omit the percentage 
working population as an explanatory variable in the interest of retaining observations.  
This explanatory variable is included in the results in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.   
Looking at the results using per capita income as the dependent variable, income 
per worker, educational attainment and the capital-labor ratio are all positively related to 
per capita income at the 5% or better significance level.  The coefficient on income per 
proprietor is unexpectedly negative and significant when fixed effects are taken into 
account.  The unexpected sign may be due to the high correlation between income per 
proprietor and income per worker.
138
   
The coefficients on the variables of interest seem to reveal that interest group 
activity has a significantly negative impact on per capita income within U.S. states.  
Longer state constitutions and more government transfers have a negative impact on per 
capita income.  Also, states that give out more transfers, have larger legislatures and 
disproportionate house-to-senate seats tend to have lower per capita incomes.  In 
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addition, the more recently a state has ratified its constitution, the lower its per capita 
income.  The only unexpected coefficient was that on lobby score.  Higher lobby scores 
indicate greater transparency in lobbying activities; therefore, lobbying should be costlier 
in states with higher lobby scores leading to less lobbying activity.  A possible 
explanation for this negative coefficient on lobby scores is that many businesses may 
choose not to locate themselves in a state where they will have a difficult time obtaining 
government favor.   If laws are too strict regarding lobbying activity, then big business 
may keep clear of those areas. 
When using new housing units and the value of those units as measures for 
economic development it is obvious that population, income per proprietor, income per 
worker and the capital-labor ratio have positive impacts.  Surprisingly, the coefficient on 
education is negative.  A possible explanation for this is that new housing units show up 
in those areas which are still developing and need a great deal of construction work done.  
In order to develop the area, workers must come in to aid in the construction of new 
buildings and homes.  Typically the workers that perform this manual labor are not 
required to have a great deal of education, so it may be the case that new construction 
occurs when the population has a lower average education. 
The constitutional variables of interest tell a similar story when using housing as a 
measure of development.  The longer the state constitution and the more recently it was 
ratified, the fewer and less valuable new housing a state has.   The lobby score coefficient 
also tells the same story from the per capita income analysis in that the coefficient is still 
negative suggesting that more transparency in lobbying activities may keep developers 
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out since they will have more trouble obtaining government favor.  It seems that allowing 
states to have different policies on lobbying transparency would in turn cause some 
businesses to choose to develop in those less transparent states.  
The coefficients on the legislative variables of interest are very different from 
those results found in the per capita income analysis.  The coefficients for house-to-
senate ratio and the size of legislatures are negatively related to housing development 
when fixed effects are not accounted for; however, they become positive when fixed 
effects are accounted for.  The same is true for the coefficient on state transfer payments.  
The inconsistency in these results may suggest that housing entrepreneurs may already 
have stakes placed in state legislatures such that they get government favors and are able 
to keep the competition out because of the high price of legislation.   
To further investigate the effects of interest group activity on development, the 
number of initial public offerings (IPOs) was also used to proxy economic development.  
The results using this measure continue to suggest that lobbying activity is negatively 
related to growth.  Lobby score still has a negative coefficient as does the size of 
legislatures.  All other coefficients were insignificant with the exception of population 
and education; however, house-to-senate ratio and year of ratification each have negative 
coefficients.  Contrary to prediction, transfers and length of constitution tend to have 
positive coefficients.  But, if you can get more transfer payments, you may be more likely 






The analysis provided in this chapter does provide evidence here that interest 
groups stifle development.  What is assumed in this study is that political institutions 
influence the amount of interest group activity, then interest groups influence policy, and 
finally policy influences development.  But, it is not clear that this is a one-way 
causation.  An increasing amount of work has begun in the area of political economy to 
decipher exactly how differences arise in policies and economic outcomes across 
countries.  Possibly a more accurate assumption in this study is that more interest group 
activity will occur where the cost of the activity is lower.  Interest group activity is not a 
simple task to measure, so the variables of interest have measured where the costs of 
those activities are higher.  
Although these results do not shed light on how preferences over economic and 
political outcomes are aggregated and then translated into institutions and policies, they 
do provide information on important correlations between economic outcomes and 
political institutions.   In addition, the measures of development used in this chapter may 
not completely account for overall state development, but they do provide information on 
three aspects of important development:  standard of living, business and housing.       
Another underlying assumption in this chapter is that all interest groups produce 
economically damaging policies.  Obviously there are interest groups who, in some 
instances, seek to rid state economies of stringent business regulation and taxes simply 
for their own benefit.  But, for any economic “good” an interest group might do, there are 
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always real resources spent and there is always more legislation sought to offer additional 
protection and favor.  Interest groups were once seen as a positive step toward an 
efficient political system.
139
 Yet much research has been done to counter this line of 
thinking and support Olson’s school of thought.
140
  He theorized that for any good 
interest groups could do for an economy, the harm done through wasting resources and 
obtaining transfers had a much larger impact.    
For example, environmental interest groups have played a major role in helping to 
establish property rights for common access resources such as fisheries.  Well-defined 
and enforced property rights have long been associated with higher levels of income.  
However, they have also helped to produce such policies as CAFE
141
 standards for 
automobiles as well as immense funding for ethanol producers.
142
     
  Whether the outcome of our political system is deemed efficient or not, the 
pressure from an organized few on the unorganized many seems to be a serious flaw of 
democracy.  Changes in the way people react to the incentives set before them are close 
to impossible on an aggregate level.  In other words, we cannot simply tell people to 
behave differently.  People and groups react optimally to the rules of the game, so there is 
no need to blame interest groups, politicians or voters for the economic outcome of a 
political structure.  In order to see a change for the better, we cannot hope to sway 
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preferences; we can only hope to change the rules of the game with the incentives of 
players in mind in order to see changes in how our economy works.  Seemingly the best 
way to see political changes come to fruition is through much research and education. 
  Future work on this topic will explore alternative ways to measure economic 
development and interest group activity.  It is important to understand how interest 
groups relate to economic outcomes in order to further understand how to translate 
preferences over economic and political outcomes into institutions and policies.  Critics 
of this theory, such as Unger and van Waarden, have argued that interest groups do not 
rise over time or as an economy becomes more politically stable.  They argue that interest 
groups merge and out-compete each other in the long run, leaving fewer, more powerful 
interest groups.
143
  To account for their criticism, data are being collected on the assets of 
interest groups to further explain economic development.  This should shed some light on 
the question of whether more monetarily powerful groups have an impact on economic 
development. 
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Three main conclusions can be drawn from the preceding chapters.  First, private 
markets for education create positive externalities on the educational quality received by 
public school students.  The presence of competition between these two substitutable 
educational goods promotes more efficient behavior from public schools, which increases 
the performance of public school students.  But, public schools must first realize they are 
losing the competition before they can take measures to provide a better quality education 
to those students remaining in public schools.  These measures will also take time to 
conduct, all of which will delay a recognizable improvement in student performance. 
It is widely held that because public institutions have different incentives than 
private firms, their reactions to the same change in environment will either be delayed or 
completely different from that of private firms.  Previous studies have ignored this 
general difference in reactions from public institutions and have focused only on the 
immediate effects on public school performance when faced with greater competition 
from private schools.  Obviously education is an important political issue and voters are 
likely to eventually get rid of elected officials that generate outcomes in educational 
quality that are not up to par with voter expectations.    
So, there is eventual improvement in public school performance when private 
schools begin to take over the market for education.  According to the results provided in 
Chapter II, the measurable improvement could take anywhere from 5, 10 or even 20 years 
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to show up.  While this may seem like an incredibly long lag, it follows the thought that 
public establishments are differently motivated than private ones.  Another important 
implication of these results is the positive effect private markets have on the decisions 
made by public officials which are important to economic development.   
Second, differences in interest group formation depend on population differences, 
socioeconomic development, differences in the structure of legislature, government and 
industry, and public funds spending. According to the results provided, more highly 
populated states have more interest groups.  There is also an implication in this result that 
the cost of regulation per person decreases for Congress as population increases.  
Higher per capita income appears to be associated with fewer interest groups, as 
hypothesized in the introduction.  The structure of legislature is important to interest 
groups in that larger senate majority sizes make it more costly for interest groups to 
obtain legislation.  Also, more legislative committees make it more difficult for interest 
groups to gain a significant influence in legislation and the price of legislation is higher 
where the ratio of house members to senate members is higher.  Larger legislative sizes 
generate more interest groups, which may indicate that more representatives increase a 
group’s chance of being considered a serious constituent of an elected representative. 
Additional government structure was measured by the length of state constitutions 
and the dollar amount of state transfer payments.  Longer state constitutions are 
associated with fewer interest groups, potentially indicating that durable constitutional 
transfers obtained by incumbent groups are keeping other competing groups from 
entering the market for constitutional government favor.  More transfer payments tend to 
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generate more groups lined up for handouts.  Highly concentrated industry tends to result 
in fewer total groups and most likely a few very influential groups. 
Third, the factors that foster interest group formation are associated with less 
economic development.  As discussed in the introductory chapter, my results indicate that 
interest groups do indeed create an overall negative impact on the development of 
income, business and housing within the U.S. states.  States where interest group activity 
is prevalent tend to have lower per capita incomes, fewer businesses that invest in going 
public in the stock market, and fewer and less valuable houses being built.   
With the recent U.S. federal government policy of dolling out transfers to financial 
institutions and the automotive industry, just to name a few, it should be clear that this 
kind of favor shown to the few over the many is not likely the solution to our recent 
economic downfall.  Specifically, many organized groups will see this as an opportunity 
to get in on the action of obtaining government handouts.  As my results suggest, more 
state transfer payments are a hindrance to economic development, reasoning which 
almost surely translates in a similar fashion when it comes federal transfer payments. 
Also, rather than allowing inefficient businesses to move out of the role of 
production, we have again created the precedent of allowing pressure from once powerful 
industries to dictate the direction of our economy.  As economic growth studies have 
shown, investments in education, capital and technology are some of the most important 
factors for keeping our economy strong.  As my results suggest investment in gaining 
government favor and wealth transfers are draining to our economy.  This conclusion 







Chapter II Results 
 




(Observations = 399) Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
API Test Score 688.64 60.88 316.33 831.49 
Average School-level 
Enrollment 386.25 138.6 57.57 754.24 
Parental Education 2.84 0.35 1.33 3.86 
Full Teaching Credentials 93.17 6.32 42.8 100 
Percent on State-provided 
Meal Plan 41.53 14.23 4.71 78.04 
Percent African American 4.08 4.58 0 20.25 
Percent American Indian 2.64 3.19 0 16.59 
Percent Asian 5.37 6.84 0 43.7 
Percent Filipino 1.62 2.17 0 10.18 
Percent Hispanic 29.45 19.29 3.1 86.59 
Percent Pacific Islander 0.49 0.48 0 3.35 
Percent Middle Schools  16 5 0 33 
Percent High Schools 21 10 0 60 
Population Homogeneity 
(Herfindahl Index) 4056.92 1360.48 534.43 8202.8 
Percent Private Enrollment 
(current) 9 12 0 96 
Percent Catholic 23 11 5 62 
1990 Private Enrollment 8502.97 25087.78 3 185714 
1980 Private Enrollment 8805.28 26939.06 0 200050 
Total Public Schools 129.29 235.18 2 1836 
Variance of Public 
Enrollment 1087612 14200000 11.56 231000000 
 
Notes:  “percent middle schools,” “percent high schools,””percent private”and“percent Catholic,” are multiplied by 
100 to show the percentage terms, but were not multiplied by 100 when used as explanatory variables. 
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Table 2.3:  Summary Statistics School-level Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
School Average Test Score 51302 684.88 122.53 231 999 
Total School Enrollment 51302 541.34 455.67 11 4125 
School Avg. Parental Education 51296 2.74 0.77 0 5 
School Average Teacher Quality 51301 89.51 13.52 0 100 
Percent of Students on Meal Plan 51302 48.91 30.61 0 100 
Percent African American 51302 8.12 12.26 0 100 
Percent American Indian 51302 1.16 3.57 0 100 
Percent Asian 51302 7.79 11.87 0 100 
Percent Filipino 51302 2.34 4.57 0 77 
Percent Hispanic 51302 40.57 28.62 0 100 
Percent Pacific Islander 51302 0.63 1.20 0 25 
 
Table 2.4:  OLS Estimation Results using ln (API) as the Dependent Variable  
Dependent Variable  Test Score 
 (Observations = 51295) Coefficient Std. Error 
Total School Enrollment **0.024  (  0.003)  
Parental Education (school average) **0.061  (  0.001)  
Teacher quality (school average) **0.001  (  0.000)  
Percent on meal plan **-0.002  (  0.000)  
Percent African American **-0.002  (  0.000)  
Percent American Indian **-0.003  (  0.000)  
Percent Asian **0.001  (  0.000)  
Percent Filipino **0.001  (  0.000)  
Percent Hispanic **-0.002  (  0.000)  
Percent Pacific Islander **-0.002  (  0.000)  
Enrollment * Middle Dummy **0.078  (  0.004)  
Enrollment * High Dummy **-0.026  (  0.004)  
Middle School Dummy **-0.276  (  0.004)  
High School Dummy **-0.043  (  0.003)  
Constant **6.308  (  0.008)  
Year Fixed Effects yes   
R
2
 0.73   
 
 
Notes:   **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%; Robust Standard Errors reported; Total enrollment, 
Enrollment*Middle and Enrollment *High scaled by 1000; school-level data; log-linear specification 
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Table 2.5:  OLS Estimation Results Using Residuals as the Dependent Variable  
(School-level Data) 
 
OLS (log-log) OLS (log-log) 
Dependent Variable Residuals Residuals 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Private Enrollment 1990 **0.012  (     0.004)            0.005  (     0.004)  
Private Enrollment 1980     **0.008  (     0.002)  
Percent Private (current) **-0.004  (     0.002)  **-0.004  (     0.002)  
Number of Public Schools **-0.027  (     0.007)  **-0.027  (     0.007)  
Variance of Public Enrollment *-0.003  (     0.002)  *-0.003  (     0.002)  
Population Homogeneity           0.003  (     0.014)            0.003  (     0.014)  
Constant           0.028  (     0.111)            0.023  (     0.112)  
County Fixed Effects yes   yes   
Year Fixed Effects in orig. eq.   in orig. eq.   
R2   0.60   0.60 
Observations   391   391 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%; Standard Errors clustered by county; Residuals are from the 
Specification in Table 1.4; County averaged data 
 
 
Table 2.6:  IV Estimation Results Using Residuals as the Dependent Variable 
  
IV (log-log) IV (log-log) 
Dependent Variable Residuals Residuals 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Private Enrollment 1990 **0.009  (     0.004)            0.002  (     0.004)  
Private Enrollment 1980     **0.007  (     0.002)  
Percent Private (current)           0.001  (     0.001)            0.001  (     0.001)  
Number of Public Schools **-0.024     (     0.007)  **-0.025  (     0.007)  
Variance of Public Enrollment          -0.002  (     0.002)           -0.002  (     0.002)  
Population Homogeneity           0.002  (     0.014)            0.002  (     0.014)  
Constant           0.049  (     0.109)            0.043  (     0.110)  
County Fixed Effects yes   yes   
Year Fixed Effects in orig. eq.   in orig. eq.   
R2   0.59   0.59 
Observations   391   391 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%; Standard Errors clustered by county; Residuals are from the 
Specification in Table 1.4; County averaged data 
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Table 2.7:  Comparison of School-level and County-level Coefficients (OLS log-log) 
 
Dependent Variable 




† Variable used in county average 
model/Variable used in school-level 
model Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Private Enrollment 1990 *0.043  (     0.022)            0.005 (     0.004) 
Private Enrollment 1980 **0.030  (     0.014)  **0.008 (     0.002) 
Percent Private (current)           0.028  (     0.254)  **-0.004 (     0.002) 
Average Public 
Enrollment/Total Enrollment†          -0.011  (     0.048)  **0.024 (     0.003) 
Number of Public Schools          -0.034  (     0.033)  **-0.027 (     0.007) 
Variance of Pub. Enroll **-0.013  (     0.005)  *-0.003 (     0.002) 
Parental Education **0.085  (     0.036)  **0.061 (     0.001) 
Teacher Quality **0.008  (     0.001)  **0.001 (     0.000) 
Percent Meals           0.001  (     0.001)  **-0.002 (     0.000) 
Population Homogeneity          -0.023  (     0.022)            0.003 (     0.014) 
African American **-0.015  (     0.006)  **-0.002 (     0.000) 
American Indian **-0.011  (     0.004)  **-0.003 (     0.000) 
Asian **-0.010  (     0.003)  **0.001 (     0.000) 
Filipino          -0.002  (     0.011)  **0.001 (     0.000) 
Hispanic **0.006  (     0.002)  **-0.002 (     0.000) 
Pacific Islander           0.002  (     0.018)  **-0.002 (     0.000) 
Percent of total schools 
Middle/Middle Dummy†          -0.122  (     0.086)  **-0.276 (     0.004) 
Percent of total schools 
High/High Dummy†           0.029  (     0.061)  **-0.043 (     0.003) 
Average Enrollment*(Percent 
Middle/Middle Dummy) †           0.018  (     0.021)  **0.078 (     0.004) 
Average Enrollment*(Percent 
High/High Dummy)†          -0.010  (     0.024)  **-0.026 (     0.004) 
County Fixed Effects yes   yes   
Year Fixed Effects yes   yes   
 










Table 2.8:  Comparison of Private Enrollment Coefficients (OLS log-log)  
 
Dependent Variable Test Score Residuals 
Without 1980 Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Private Enrollment 1990 **0.071  (    0.027)  **0.012  (     0.004)  
Percent Private (current)           0.028  (    0.025)  **-0.004  (     0.002)  
 
Dependent Variable Test Score Residuals 
With 1980 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Private Enrollment 1990 *0.043  (    0.022)            0.005  (     0.004)  
Private Enrollment 1980 **0.030  (    0.014)  **0.008  (     0.002)  
Percent Private (current)           0.028  (    0.254)  **-0.004  (     0.002)  
 


































Table 2.9:  OLS Estimation Results using ln (API) as the Dependent Variable  
(County-level data) 
 
OLS (log-log) OLS (log-log) 
Dependent Variable Test Score Test Score 
  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Private Enrollment 1990 **0.071  (     0.027)  *0.043  (     0.022)  
Private Enrollment 1980     **0.030  (     0.014)  
Percent Private (current)           0.028  (     0.025)            0.028  (     0.254)  
Average Public Enrollment          -0.011  (     0.048)           -0.011  (     0.048)  
Number of Public Schools          -0.034  (     0.033)           -0.034  (     0.033)  
Variance of Pub. Enroll **-0.013  (     0.005)  **-0.013  (     0.005)  
Parental Education **0.085  (     0.036)  **0.085  (     0.036)  
Teacher Quality **0.008  (     0.001)  **0.008  (     0.001)  
Percent Meals           0.001  (     0.001)            0.001  (     0.001)  
Population Homogeneity          -0.023  (     0.022)           -0.023  (     0.022)  
African American **-0.015  (     0.006)  **-0.015  (     0.006)  
American Indian **-0.011  (     0.004)  **-0.011  (     0.004)  
Asian **-0.010  (     0.003)  **-0.010  (     0.003)  
Filipino          -0.002  (     0.011)           -0.002  (     0.011)  
Hispanic **0.006  (     0.002)  **0.006  (     0.002)  
Pacific Islander           0.002  (     0.018)            0.002  (     0.018)  
Percent of total schools 
Middle          -0.122  (     0.086)           -0.122  (     0.086)  
Percent of total schools 
High           0.029  (     0.061)            0.029  (     0.061)  
Average 
Enrollment*Percent Middle           0.018  (     0.021)            0.018  (     0.021)  
Average 
Enrollment*Percent High          -0.010  (     0.024)           -0.010  (     0.024)  
Constant **5.715  (     0.346)  **5.693  (     0.344)  
County Fixed Effects yes   yes   
Year Fixed Effects yes   yes   
R
2
 0.95   0.95   
Observations 379   379   
 
Notes: ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%; Percent private (current), Average Enrollment*Pct M and Average 






Table 2.10:  IV Estimation Results using ln (API) as the Dependent Variable  
(County averaged data) 
 
IV (log-log) IV (log-log) 
Dependent Variable Test Score Test Score 
  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient  Std. Error 
Private Enrollment 1990 0.086  (     0.104)                  0.077  (     0.106)  
Private Enrollment 1980                   0.009  (     0.018)  
Percent Private (current) -0.072  (     0.109)                 -0.072  (     0.109)  
Average Public Enrollment -0.041  (     0.099)                 -0.041  (     0.099)  
Number of Public Schools -0.107  (     0.132)                 -0.106  (     0.132)  
Variance of Pub. Enroll *-0.017  (     0.010)  *-0.017  (     0.010)  
Parental Education *0.150  (     0.076)  *0.150  (     0.076)  
Teacher Quality **0.008  (     0.004)  **0.008  (     0.004)  
Percent Meals 0.004  (     0.004)                  0.004  (     0.004)  
Population Homogeneity -0.019  (     0.024)                 -0.019  (     0.024)  
African American 0.004  (     0.008)                  0.004  (     0.008)  
American Indian *-0.011  (     0.006)  *-0.011  (     0.006)  
Asian -0.005  (     0.005)                 -0.005  (     0.005)  
Filipino *-0.018  (     0.009)  *-0.018  (     0.009)  
Hispanic *0.010  (     0.005)  *0.010  (     0.005)  
Pacific Islander 0.032  (     0.041)                  0.032  (     0.041)  
Percent of total schools Middle -0.021  (     0.186)                 -0.021  (     0.186)  
Percent of total schools High 0.277  (     0.371)                  0.277  (     0.371)  
Average Enrollment*Percent Middle 0.003  (     0.057)                  0.003  (     0.057)  
Average Enrollment*Percent High -0.017  (     0.027)                 -0.017  (     0.027)  
Constant **5.184  (     1.196)  **5.177  (     1.192)  
County Fixed Effects yes   yes   
Year Fixed Effects yes   yes   
R2 0.73   0.73   
Observations 379   379   
 
Notes: ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%; Percent private (current), Average Enrollment*Pct M and Average 








Table 2.11:  Coefficients on Lags of Private Enrollment 
 
 
     OLS   
Lag Length on Private 
School Enrollment Obs 
County and Year 
Fixed Effects Coefficient Std. Error Significant 
(t-1) 309 no -0.43 0.31 no 
(t-2) 259 no -0.12 0.23 no 
(t-3) 207 no -0.02 0.21 no 
(t-4) 154 no  0.08 0.20 no 
(t-1) 309 yes -0.06 0.23 no 
(t-2) 259 yes -0.03 0.17 no 
(t-3) 207 yes  1.32 1.23 no 
(t-4) 154 yes  0.53 1.76 no 
 
Notes:  All coefficients scaled by 100; none were significant at the 10% or better confidence level; ln (API) as the 































Chapter III Results 
 
Figure 3.1:  The Calculation Methods Used for Herfindahl Industry Concentration: 
 








 + …..+ SN
2
) * 10,000 
 
Where, Si = (firms in industry i) / (total firms in all industries) 
 
 Using Annual Payroll of Each Industry:  
 








) * 10,000 
   
Where, Ti = (Annual payroll in industry i) / (Annual payroll in all industries)                                             
 
 
Table 3.1:  Summary Statistics for Interest Group Formation Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Trade Associations 800 123.89 162.65 1 1374 
Trade Associations Per Capita 784 27.5 18.8 0.45 107 
Population 784 5518372 5996467 453690 36200000 
Per Capita Income  800 25304.80 5836.95 13164 45318 
Senate Committees 800 15.41 6.32 4 39 
Senate Majority Size 784 70.11 36.86 20 282 
Republican Senate  
(equals 1 if Senate majority is Republican, 
0 otherwise) 784 0.95 0.23 0 1 
Length of State Constitution (in words) 725 31526.13 36001.50 6600 340136 
House-to-Senate Ratio 784 2.95 2.14 1.53 16.67 
State Transfers in Dollars (1000s) 800 3583.01 968.80 1632 8020 
Size of Legislature 784 150.26 58.01 60 424 
HHI Firms (using number of firms in 
industry) 400 921.80 31.01 838.57 1005.41 
HHI Payroll (using amount of payroll in 
each industry) 400 964.82 139.37 746.55 1499.25 
 






Table 3.2:  OLS Results Using ln (Number of Trade Associations) as the Dependent 
Variable without Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable:  ln(Trade 
Associations) OLS (log-log) OLS (log-log) 
  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Population **0.758 0.024 **0.781 0.026 
Per Capita Income **0.840 0.117 **1.431 0.125 
Number of Senate Committees **-0.196 0.032 **-0.277 0.054 
Senate Majority Size **-0.545 0.121 **-1.052 0.158 
Republican Senate Control  
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 0.03 0.056 **0.175 0.071 
Length of State Constitution (in words) **-0.062 0.027 -0.014 0.035 
House-to-Senate Ratio 0.0459 0.057 0.08 0.084 
State Transfers **0.403 0.099 **1.382 0.111 
Size of State Legislature **0.480 0.140 **0.940 0.182 
Industry Payroll Heterogeneity **-0.452 0.115     
Constant **-14.581 1.721 **-32.919 1.110 
County Fixed Effects no   no   
Year Fixed Effects no   no   
R2 0.88   0.79   
Observations 352   709   
 




















Table 3.3:  IV Results Using ln (Number of Trade Associations) as the Dependent 
Variable without Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable:  ln(Trade 
Associations) IV (log-log) IV (log-log) 





Population **0.759 0.026 **0.794 0.029 
Per Capita Income **0.741 0.172 **2.096 0.168 
Number of Senate Committees **-0.205 0.035 **-0.244 0.058 
Senate Majority Size **-0.596 0.137 **-0.982 0.173 
Republican Senate Control  
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 0.041 0.057 **0.162 0.074 
Length of State Constitution (in words) **-0.063 0.031 -0.004 0.387 
House-to-Senate Ratio 0.061 0.065 -0.014 0.091 
State Transfers **0.472 0.122 **1.040 0.123 
Size of State Legislature **0.527 0.158 **0.947 0.202 
Industry Payroll Heterogeneity **-0.490 0.129     
Constant **-13.883 2.233 **-37.478 1.400 
County Fixed Effects no   no   
Year Fixed Effects no   no   
R2 0.88   0.78   
Observations 303   657   
 




















Table 3.4:  OLS Results Using ln (Number of Trade Associations) as the Dependent 
Variable with Fixed Effects 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  ln(Trade 
Associations) OLS (log-log) OLS (log-log) 
  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Population **0.502 0.176 0.197 0.201 
Per Capita Income **-0.099 0.036 **-0.194 0.091 
Number of Senate Committees 0.014 0.020 -0.034 0.082 
Senate Majority Size -0.040 0.044 -0.039 0.094 
Republican Senate Control 
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 0.006 0.012 -0.067 0.053 
Length of State Constitution  
(in words) 0.023 0.033 -0.066 0.063 
House-to-Senate Ratio **-0.276 0.081 *-0.544 0.303 
State Transfers *0.185 0.111 *0.461 0.255 
Size of State Legislature **0.391 0.088 0.503 0.376 
Industry Payroll Heterogeneity -0.021 0.122     
Constant **-5.552 2.741 -3.782 4.583 
County Fixed Effects yes   yes   
Year Fixed Effects yes   yes   
R2 100   0.98   
Observations 352   709   
 
 



















Table 3.5:  IV Results Using ln (Number of Trade Associations) as the Dependent 
Variable with Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable:  ln(Trade 
Associations) IV (log-log) IV (log-log) 
  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Population **0.500 0.204 -0.069 0.394 
Per Capita Income -0.170 0.141 -1.528 1.441 
Number of Senate Committees 0.018 0.029 0.017 0.136 
Senate Majority Size -0.035 0.051 -0.097 0.141 
Republican Senate Control 
 (1=yes, 0=otherwise) 0.002 0.013 -0.030 0.070 
Length of State Constitution 
 (in words) 0.015 0.035 -0.111 0.076 
House-to-Senate Ratio **-0.225 0.088 -0.279 0.483 
State Transfers 0.411 0.315 -0.366 1.231 
Size of State Legislature **0.322 0.104 0.325 0.545 
Industry Payroll Heterogeneity -0.003 0.126     
Constant -6.483 5.114 20.787 28.944 
County Fixed Effects yes   yes   
Year Fixed Effects yes   yes   
R2 100   0.97   
Observations 303   657   
 



















Table 3.6:  OLS Results Using ln (Natural log of Trade Associations Per Capita) as 
the Dependent Variable without Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable:  ln(Trade 
Associations Per Capita) OLS (log-log) OLS (log-log) 





Per Capita Income **0.759 0.118 **1.463 0.123 
Number of Senate Committees **-0.283 0.031 **-0.352 0.054 
Senate Majority Size -0.152 0.145 **-0.666 0.155 
Republican Senate Control (1=yes, 
0=otherwise) 0.023 0.069 **0.176 0.078 
Length of State Constitution (in words) **-0.197 0.026 **-0.152 0.030 
House-to-Senate Ratio *0.143 0.076 0.145 0.091 
State Transfers **0.449 0.105 **1.366 0.109 
Size of State Legislature -0.256 0.147 0.249 0.166 
Industry Payroll Heterogeneity -0.225 0.142     
Constant **-15.807 2.080 **-33.057 1.134 
County Fixed Effects no   no   
Year Fixed Effects no   no   
R2 0.42   0.60   
Observations 352   709   
 



















Table 3.7:  IV Results Using ln (Natural log of Trade Associations Per Capita) as the 
Dependent Variable without Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable:  ln(Trade 
Associations Per Capita) IV (log-log) IV (log-log) 
  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Per Capita Income **1.000 0.189 **2.101 0.165 
Number of Senate Committees **-0.280 0.034 **-0.316 0.059 
Senate Majority Size -0.171 0.162 **-0.619 0.166 
Republican Senate Control (1=yes, 
0=otherwise) 0.019 0.073 **0.162 0.080 
Length of State Constitution  
(in words) **-0.186 0.028 **-0.131 0.034 
House-to-Senate Ratio 0.126 0.087 0.051 0.097 
State Transfers **0.420 0.133 **1.034 0.124 
Size of State Legislature -0.227 0.164 0.292 0.181 
Industry Payroll Heterogeneity -0.159 0.161     
Constant **-18.654 2.715 **-37.395 1.407 
County Fixed Effects no   no   
Year Fixed Effects no   no   
R2 0.41   0.58   
Observations 303   657   
 



















Table 3.8:  OLS Results Using ln (Trade Associations Per Capita) as the Dependent 
Variable with Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(Trade Associations Per 
Capita) OLS (log-log) OLS (log-log) 
  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Per Capita Income **-0.088 0.038 *-0.163 0.095 
Number of Senate 
Committees 0.014 0.020 -0.026 0.080 
Senate Majority Size -0.062 0.046 -0.041 0.095 
Republican Senate Control 
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 0.005 0.014 -0.071 0.053 
Length of State Constitution 
(in words) 0.012 2.980 *-0.107 0.064 
House-to-Senate Ratio **-0.280 0.082 *-0.554 0.331 
State Transfers *0.225 0.115 **0.698 0.248 
Size of State Legislature **0.393 0.088 0.478 0.424 
Industry Payroll 
Heterogeneity -0.013 0.126     
Constant **-13.293 1.436 **-17.497 3.129 
County Fixed Effects yes   yes   
Year Fixed Effects yes   yes   
R2 0.99   0.96   
Observations 352   709   
 
Notes:  The coefficient on Length of State Constitution including the HHI measure was scaled by 100; ** 

















Table 3.9:  OLS Results Using ln (Trade Associations Per Capita) as the Dependent 
Variable with Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(Trade Associations Per 
Capita) IV (log-log) IV (log-log) 
  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Per Capita Income -0.161 0.146 -2.026 1.904 
Number of Senate 
Committees 0.025 0.028 0.063 0.161 
Senate Majority Size -0.055 0.053 -0.119 0.167 
Republican Senate Control 
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 0.001 0.015 -0.017 0.083 
Length of State Constitution 
(in words) -0.007 0.031 *-0.174 0.093 
House-to-Senate Ratio **-0.244 0.088 -0.203 0.593 
State Transfers 0.481 0.309 -0.254 1.431 
Size of State Legislature **0.340 0.106 0.227 0.698 
Industry Payroll 
Heterogeneity 0.010 0.129     
Constant **-14.631 3.920 9.601 30.806 
County Fixed Effects yes   yes   
Year Fixed Effects yes   yes   
R2 0.41   0.58   
Observations 303   657   
 
















Chapter IV Results 
 
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Interest Groups and Economic Development 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Per Capita Income 800 25304.80 5836.95 13164 45318 
Housing Units 750 29399.24 34052.18 631 255893 
Housing Unit Value 800 3378358 4732455 61584 46800000 
IPOs 650 28.40 113.64 0 1094 
Population 800 5423855 5947771 453401 36100000 
Income Per Proprietor 800 19.76 6.25 1 42.65 
Income Per Worker 800 27.33 6.69 14.01 49.98 
House-to-Senate Ratio 784 0.40 0.11 0.06 0.66 
Size of Legislature 784 150.26 58.01 60 424 
Capital-Labor Ratio 800 0.33 0.06 -0.08 0.61 
Working Population 700 0.51 0.03 0.42 0.58 
Percent with Bachelor's Degree 800 23.67 4.83 12.30 37.40 
Dollar Amount of Transfer 
Payments 800 3583.01 968.80 1632 8020 
Latest Constitution Year 800 1894.78 50.23 1780 1983 
Length of State Constitution 
(in words) 725 31526.13 36001.50 6600 340136 
Lobby Score 800 58.40 13.47 0 87 
 
 
Notes: All Data range from 1990-2005, with the exception of IPOs, Housing Units, Working population and 
Length.  IPOs are not available prior to 1994 and Housing Units only available through 2004.  Working population 






























Population       **1.107 0.033 **1.073 0.036 **0.945 0.120 
Income Per 
Proprietor -0.004 0.011 **0.290 0.031 **0.229 0.029 -0.117 0.111 
Income Per 
Worker **0.375 0.043 **1.213 0.223 **1.025 0.244 0.413 0.738 
Percent with 
Bachelor's Degree **0.186 0.033 0.198 0.167 *-0.318 0.181 **2.339 0.612 
Capital-Labor 
Ratio **0.198 0.031 0.202 0.153 *0.317 0.168 0.614 0.459 
Length of State 
Constitution  
(in words) **-0.016 0.006 **-0.114 0.027 **-0.088 0.027 0.057 0.105 
Dollar Amount of 
Transfer Payments *-0.045 0.024 -0.205 0.126 **-0.684 0.133 0.003 0.455 
State Constitution 
Year **-0.549 0.188 **-1.899 0.816 -1.103 0.832 -0.857 2.436 
House-to-Senate 
Ratio **-0.066 0.019 -0.011 0.062 -0.006 0.061 -0.158 0.224 
Size of State 
Legislature *-0.035 0.020 **-0.424 0.093 **-0.296 0.096 **-0.924 0.401 
Lobby Score **-0.160 0.030 **-0.256 0.112 -0.021 0.119 **-0.802 0.362 
Constant **8.900 1.447 **12.804 6.223 7.267 6.347 -6.688 18.346 
R
2
 0.46 0.86 0.85 0.39 
Observations 693 693 646 367 
 
Notes:  State and year fixed effects are not accounted for in the above table; the coefficients represent a log-log 
















Table 4.3:  OLS Regression Results Using Various Measures of Development 

















Population       **0.879 0.168 **0.893 0.215 -0.629 1.930 
Income Per 
Proprietor 
**-0.096 0.038 -0.007 0.065 0.08 0.077 0.368 0.499 
Income Per 
Worker 




0.216 0.146 **-0.605 0.274 **-0.617 0.309 1.229 1.961 
Capital-Labor 
Ratio 









**-0.435 0.101 *0.376 0.203 0.15 0.255 -1.948 2.562 
House-to-
Senate Ratio 
-0.181 0.143 **0.644 0.262 **0.655 0.265 -0.704 1.927 
Size of State 
Legislature 
-0.173 0.194 **0.685 0.315 **0.851 0.372 -1.292 2.547 
Lobby Score **-0.660 0.218 -1.308 1.133 **-3.288 1.484 (dropped)   
Constant **10.662 1.156 -0.878 4.735 4.639 3.666 31.875 42.957 
R
2
 0.73 0.99 0.98 0.78 
Observations 693 693 646 367 
 
 
Notes:  Both state and year fixed effects are accounted for in the above table; the coefficients represent a log-log 












Table 4.4:  OLS Regression Results Using Various Measures of Development 


















Population       **1.115 0.035 **1.087 0.037 **0.979 0.135 
Income Per 
Proprietor 
-0.001 0.012 **0.283 0.033 **0.213 0.031 -0.083 0.130 
Income Per 
Worker 




**0.222 0.040 0.047 0.162 **-0.491 0.174 **2.470 0.647 
Capital-
Labor Ratio 
**0.217 0.034 0.014 0.181 0.03 0.196 0.533 0.506 
Working 
Population 











*-0.053 0.028 -0.011 0.140 **-0.403 0.147 0.311 0.534 
Year of State 
Constitution 
**-0.763 0.232 -0.468 0.948 0.90 0.954 -0.817 2.863 
House-to-
Senate Ratio 
**-0.070 0.021 -0.032 0.067 -0.047 0.068 -0.178 0.244 
Size of State 
Legislature 
*-0.039 0.023 **-0.493 0.100 **-0.412 0.101 **-0.984 0.450 
Lobby Score **-0.194 0.033 -0.166 0.119 0.092 0.127 *-0.658 0.365 
Constant **10.561 1.772 2.097 7.205 -7.513 7.274 -9.786 21.604 
R
2
 0.43 0.86 0.86 0.43 
Observations 617 617 570 312 
 
Notes:  “Working Population” was not included in Tables 4.2and 4.3 in the interest of lost observations as 2001-2002 
data were not reported; State and year fixed effects are not accounted for in the above table; the coefficients represent 
a log-log function and should be interpreted as elasticities; robust standard errors reported; **significant at 5%; 





Table 4.5:  OLS Regression Results Using Various Measures of Development 


















Population       **1.201 0.176 **1.172 0.230 -1.122 2.317 
Income Per 
Proprietor 
**-0.090 0.042 -0.018 0.066 0.09 0.084 0.521 0.566 
Income Per 
Worker 




0.208 0.175 **-0.774 0.311 **-0.890 0.362 1.526 1.989 
Capital-
Labor Ratio 
0.048 0.103 0.237 0.169 0.22 0.238 -2.085 1.485 
Working 
Population 











**-0.411 0.114 **0.521 0.205 0.33 0.259 -3.655 2.808 
House-to-
Senate Ratio 
-0.212 0.137 **0.970 0.208 **1.063 0.223 -1.859 2.892 
Size of State 
Legislature 
-0.254 0.186 **1.043 0.234 **1.323 0.292 -2.953 4.215 
Lobby Score -0.232 0.405 -1.077 0.981 **-5.599 1.494 (dropped)   
Constant **9.382 2.092 **-8.603 2.269 *7.096 3.892 51.807 48.637 
R2 0.76 0.98 0.98 0.79 
Observations 617 617 570 312 
 
Notes:  “Working Population” was not included in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 in the interest of lost observations as 2001-2002 
data were not reported; State and year fixed effects are accounted for in the above table; the coefficients represent a 
log-log function and should be interpreted as elasticities; robust standard errors reported; **significant at 5%; 
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